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BEYOND THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT:
UNLEASHING THE STATES IN LABOR-

MANAGEMENT RELATIONS POLICY
Henry H. Drummonds*
This Article proposes a major devolution of labor relations policy
making authority to the states. Echoing the federalism discussion in
other contexts like global warming and prescriptiondrugs, labor relation
preemption doctrine should be examined and reformed by Congress. Existing doctrine is entirely judge-made even though only Congress, not the
states, carries authority under the constitutional division of powers to
displace state law. This judge-createdpreemption law stifles labor relations measures in the states, and leaves labor law smothered in federal
orthodoxy.
Federal labor law reform is necessary for two reasons. First, the
private sector unions face near extinction as collective bargainingrepresentatives with fewer than eight percent of private sector employees represented. A rebalancingof labor relationspolicy is necessary to protect
andfoster employee free choice on questions of representationand collective voice. The Employee Free Choice Act debate only opened discussion of the many changes possible. Second, new policies more favorable
to representationand employee voice can help to rebuild more structural
balance in an economy now beset by the swollen powers of the executive
suite and financial industry.
The needed changes are more likely to arise in the states than in
Washington, D.C. Viewed in the largercontext of employment law generally, the current broadfederal labor law preemption doctrines are out
of step. In wage and hour, occupational safety and health, status discrimination,and leave law, the states andfederal government share authority within federal minimum standardsand the states have often been
innovators of needed reforms. Sharedfederal-state authority allows experimentation,flexibility, and greater citizen autonomy and involvement.
Furthermore,viewed in their own right, the current doctrines find
little support in the rationales offered for them, and are riddled with
exceptions and inconsistencies. Thus, the Garmon doctrine'spreemption
of conduct "arguably" protectedor prohibited by federal law sweeps far
* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. The author expresses his deep appreciation to his research assistants, secretaries, and colleagues whose support for this Article was
indispensable.
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broader than necessary to protect federal interests; it was controversial
at its inception, and has lost any convincing rationale today. The primary agency jurisdictionrationale reflected a now outmodedfaith in federal administrative agencies, was undermined by repeated rejection of
the "expertise" based judgments of the National Labor Relations Board
by the courts, and currently suffers from the politicizationof the Board.
Furthera mass of exceptions and limitations make this one of the most
complex and little understood areas in all of the law of the workplace.
The Machinists doctrine's "free play of economic forces" rationale
rested,like Garmon, on implied "obstacle" preemption analysis now less
favored by the courts, and in any event, is logically inconsistent with
established law allowing the states to legislate labor standardsdirectly
and to determine whether to grant or withhold unemployment benefits
during a strike or lockout. In addition, both Garmon and Machinists
make little sense in light of the "reverse preemption" provisions of Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act that allow the states to set
labor relations policy on the fundamental issue of state "right to work"
laws. This internal inconsistency is further reflected in federal labor
law's use of balancing of state law property rights to determine issues of
union access.
Finally, this Article makes some suggestions about what a congressional reworking of labor law preemption doctrine might look like. The
largerpoint, however, is that the creative ideas and experiments in labor
relations are far more likely to originatefrom ferment in state capitals
than from the common denominator policies necessary to overcome
gridlock in Washington, D.C.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article proposes that Congress enact a major decentralization
of labor relations law-the law that governs efforts by employees to collectively deal with their employers through unions and collective bargaining.1 Two recent events have signaled the reemergence of federal
preemption as an issue in labor law. First, in 2007, the U.S. House of
2
Representatives passed the Employee Free Choice Act of 2007 (EFCA),
3
triggering the deepest fundamental debate about labor relations policy
I Although this Article uses the conventional reference to "employers," in reality, the
relationship governed by labor relations law is most often that between employees and the
management of large organizations. That management does not always act to maximize shareholder value found vivid illustration in the spectacle of Wall Street financial firm executives
taking huge bonuses, even as their firms faced the threat or reality of bankruptcy or forced sale
during the recent financial crisis. See, e.g., Louise Story, On Wall Street, Bonuses, Not Profits,
Were Real, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at Al. While the "stakeholder" theory of corporations
languished in recent years, it did find expression in state statutes often enacted to enhance
defenses against hostile takeovers. See, e.g., 6A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2841.20 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2005)

(listing state statutes in footnotes). Moreover, while cooperative workplace relationships often
prevail in human resources policy today, as Oliver W. Holmes observed more than a century
ago, "One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the effort of
every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised under the name
of capital, to get his services for the least possible return." Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E.
1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896). What Holmes saw as a clash of labor and capital, in our time, with
pension and retirement funds often holding substantial equity positions, might better be seen as
a clash between ordinary employees and executive suite managers in corporations and financial firms. Of course, there has been far more sharing of corporate bounty in some industries
via stock options and other devices than in others.
2 Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2008).
3 Compare Stewart Acuff & Sheldon Friedman, Union Choice Would Help A Faltering
Economy, INsTrruTE FOR AMERICA'S Fu-ruRE, Feb. 5 2008, http://institute.ourfuture.org/progressive-opinion/union-choice-would-help-fatering-economy,
with Nelson Cary & Sater
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since the 1947 Republican Congress reined in the power of unions
through the Taft-Hartley Act. 4 Unlike the debate sixty years ago, the
current debate is not about excessive union power, but about whether
labor relations law should become more favorable to employee organization in unions. 5 While many possibilities for change in labor relations
policy exist, national consensus often eludes policy makers.
Vorys, The EFCA's Destruction of Workplace Democracy, LAw360, Sept. 10, 2008, http:I/
employment.law360.com/printarticle/68172. Political considerations permeate the issue in
part because unionized blue-collar workers more often vote for Democrats based on economic
issues, while non-unionized blue-collar workers more often prefer Republicans based on social
issues. Peter L. Francia, Voting on Values or Bread-and-Butter?Effects of Union Membership
on the Politics of the White Working Class, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, Summer 2008/Winter
2009 at 27, 29.
4 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat.
136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (2006)). In reaction to perceived abuses of
union power during and after World War I, the 1947 Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act
over President Truman's veto. See Archibald Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1947); Donald H. Wollett, Collective Bargaining,
Public Policy and the National Labor Relations Act of 1947, 23 WASH. L. REV. 205 (1948).
Thus, only 12 years after the enactment of the New Deal-era National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69 (2006)), federal policy shifted from explicitly favoring collective bargaining to a
position of "neutrality," balancing the interests of employees, unions, and employers in "the
national labor policy." See also Nelson Lichtenstein, How Wal-Mart Fights Unions, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 1462, 1465-66 (2008).
There have been several attempts to amend the National Labor Relations Act. In 1975,
the Common Situs Picketing Bill, H.R. 5900, 94th Cong. (1975), passed both houses of Congress, but was vetoed by President Ford. See 121 Cong. Rec. 42, 015 (1975). In 1977, the
Labor Law Reform Act, S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1977), was successfully filibustered by
Senate Republicans. See 123 Cong. Rec. 18, 393-18, 398. The Reform Act would have, inter
alia, strengthened remedies for anti-union discrimination, given unions more access to jobsites, and expedited election cases. In 1992, the proposed Workplace Fairness Act, S. 55, 102d
Cong. (1992), a bill outlawing permanent striker replacement, commanded majority support in
both houses, but again succumbed to a filibuster. See 138 Cong. Rec. 14, 865-14, 876. Finally, in 1997, the Teamwork for Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act, S. 295, 105th Cong.
(1997), would have loosened restrictions on employer-sponsored employee committees, but
was vetoed by President Clinton. See Bureau of National Affairs, Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act
Despite Pleas From Business For Passage, DAILY LAB. REP., July 31, 1996, at AA-I-AA-2.
However, none of these proposed enactments raised the across-the-board range of labor relations policy issues that were raised by Taft-Hartley and the proposed EFCA.
5 E.g. Robert Reich, Does Labor Need More Clout?, SF CHRON., Mar. 3, 2008, at B5.
President Obama recently expressed his view that passing the EFCA would help reduce income inequality, aid the middle class, and help the U.S. economy:
We need to level the playing field for workers and the unions that represent their
interests because we know you cannot have a strong middle class without a strong
labor movement. When workers are prospering they buy products that make businesses prosper. We can be competitive and lean and mean and still create a situation
where workers are thriving in this country.
Robert Kuttner, President Obama Wants You to Join a Union, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 13,
2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/president-obama-wants-you-b_162975.
html; see also David Madland & Karla Walter, Unions Are Goodfor the American Economy,
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PRooREss ACTION FUND,

action.org/issues/2009/02/efcafactsheets.html.

Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.americanprogress
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Second, in 2008, in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,6 a majority of
the U.S. Supreme Court continued the expansion of the judicially-created
federal labor law preemption doctrine by striking down a California law
limiting employer use of state monies in union organizing campaigns.
Such rulings, absent a congressional decision to supplant state authority
under the Supremacy Clause, deprive citizens of their right, under the
constitutional division of powers, to express their preferences about labor
relations policy through their state and local governments. As then-Justice Rehnquist pointed out more than twenty years ago, "From the acorns
of [two early] decisions has grown the mighty oak of this Court's labor
pre-emption doctrine, which sweeps ever outward though still totally un'7
informed by any express directive from Congress."
Part I of this Article places the issue of labor relations policy in a
larger context, and argues that a discussion of labor law preemption is
uniquely timely today. Part II surveys ground often covered by labor
relations scholars-the decline of private sector unionization, and the debate about whether the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the
Taft-Hartley Act, fails, under today's conditions, to create a viable legal
structure for fostering employee representation, voice, and free choice.
Part III outlines the debate about the EFCA and shows how the Act addresses fundamental issues in labor law on which no national consensus
exists, leaving many questions that could be profitably first addressed at
the state level. Part IV compares the broad federal preemption in labor
law to other aspects of employment law, and illustrates how labor law
preemption is out of step with the role state and local governments play
in most other areas of workplace regulation. Part V reviews the federal
labor law preemption doctrine and its origins in the different circumstances and highly disputed judicial decision making of another era, and
explains how the federal preemption doctrine has prevented state and
local governments from adopting innovations in labor relations policy.
Part V also examines the federal labor law preemption doctrine on its
own premises and shows that the doctrine not only rests upon several
major contradictions, but is also riddled with exceptions, making it one
of the most studied, but least understood, doctrinal mazes in all of employment law. Finally, Part VI offers a vision of what a more decentralized national labor policy might look like, and suggests several
enactments and experiments that could fit within a federally guaranteed
right to collective bargaining.

6 Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S.Ct. 2408 (2008).
7 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 622 (1986) (Rehn-

quist, J., dissenting).
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THE TIME IS RIPE FOR

A

FEDERALISM DISCUSSION IN LABOR LAW

A discussion of federalism issues in labor relations policy finds focus today for several reasons deeper than the EFCA debate and the Supreme Court majority's determination to continue the decades-old
judicial expansion of federal labor law's preemptive reach.
First, as Americans at every social level struggle with the Great Recession, there is new thinking, on many fronts, about structural arrangements in both the United States and global economies. 8 While the recent
debacle in the financial, equity, and housing markets kindles new calls
for regulation to correct the now evident excesses of overly deregulated
and unchecked markets, 9 calls for a more hospitable policy toward unions have also arisen. 10 This view posits collective bargaining as a balancing institution that preserves private ordering while creating more
structural balance within collective capital arrangements, i.e., the modem
corporation, through collective representation of employees. It is argued
that a more equitable sharing of the proceeds of production with employees will redound to the benefit not only of employees, but also of busi-

8 John Schwartz, of the New York Times noted that: "Many liberal thinkers skeptical
of states' rights since the days of segregation have begun to see that the states, to use Justice
Louis Brandeis' words from the 1930s, can 'serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."' John Schwartz, From New
Administration, Signals of Broader Roles for States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009 at A16. "'[I]t
may be the states that have the best initial take on [problems], and try different regulatory
methods until we fasten on a single national solution."' Id. (quoting Professor Samuel Issacharoff of New York University Law School). Of course, not everyone shares this view:
"[F]ree-for-all federalism [is] bad for business and would lead to a 'patchwork of laws impacting ... troubled industry."' Id. (quoting William L. Kovacs, a vice president of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce) (commenting on the auto industry).
9 The problem lies not in markets as an ideal, but with the imperfections of markets
caused by human greed, periods of excessive optimism during cycles of asset inflation, information disparities, transaction costs, and the "bounded rationality" ignored by neo-classical
scholars but now firmly established in the work of cognitive psychologists and behaviorists.
On the latter point, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalism Is Not
An Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). See also Michel Fouquin, Globalizationand
Its Impact on Jobs and Wages, in OFFSHORING AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EMPLOYMENT: A CHALLENGE FOR A FAIR GLOBALIZATION?, 37, 49-50 (Peter Auer et al. eds., 2006)

(showing growing income disparity in the U.S.); Joseph Stiglitz, The End of Neo-Liberalism,
PROJECT SYNDICATE, July 2008, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz101.
1o See, e.g., Kuttner, supra note 5; Reich, supra note 5; Steven Greenhouse, Unions Look
For New Life In World of Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, at B6. Indeed, as Professor
Charles J. Morris recently pointed out, Congress's original purpose in the 1935 National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006), left intact in the statutory language added in the
Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97, was to encourage collective bargaining. This was the
"core policy" of both Acts from which the NLRB has strayed. Charles J. Morris, The CongressionalPolicy of the NationalLabor Relations Act: Revisionism Exposed, 60 LAB. L. J. 34,
34-35, 39 (2009). See also Acuff & Friedman, supra note 3.

90

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19:83

ness and society in general, by building both a middle class and domestic
demand for goods and services."l
From a distributional perspective, corporations are collections of
people bringing capital, managerial expertise, and labor to the production
of goods and services. 12 They are not the personal fiefdoms of CEOs or
the Wall Street creators and sellers of securitized mortgages and other
instruments, or the toys of hedge fund managers. Society should encourage both structural balance and checks and balances in the relation13
ships among corporations' major human components.
Second, accompanying this discussion, the division of authority between federal and state lawmaking generates debate on multiple fronts.
An ancient,' 4 but rekindled, debate rages over the appropriate division of
power between the states and the federal government in the twenty-first
century,' 5 highlighted by current challenges including state-level auto-

I

I See Kuttner, supra note 5; Joseph Stiglitz, America's Houses of Cards, PROJECT SYNDICATE, October 2007, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz92.
12 See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 1; R. Edward Freeman, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1986).
13 Cf Joe Nocera, First, Let's Fix the Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A1 (2008
bonuses on Wall Street totaled $18.4 billion, though the 2008 financial crisis resulted in losses
in the fourth quarter alone of $15.3 billion; Merrill Lynch, driven to a forced sale to the Bank
of America to avoid bankruptcy, distributed $3.6 billion in bonuses in the three days before the
acquisition). The average salary of an American CEO is around 475 times higher than that of
the average American worker. See NOW on PBS, Politicsand Economy: Executive Pay, PBS,
Jan. 20, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/executivepay06.html (In 2004, the average pay
for an American worker was $27,000, as compared to $11.8 million average pay for an American CEO). The ratio of the salary of an average American worker to that of an American
CEO is staggeringly unbalanced when compared to the ratio for other industrialized countries.
See id. (noting that the ratio of CEO salary to that of the average worker is 11:1 in Japan, 12:1
in Germany, 15:1 in France, and 22:1 in Great Britain. The next most disparate ratio, compared with the United States, is Venezuela, at 50: 1); see also Richard B. Freeman, Solving the
New Inequality, XXI BOSTON REVIEW 6, Dec./Jan. 1996-97, at 3 (identifying five strategies
for addressing rising income inequality, one of which is "[e]ncourag[ing] the growth of those
citizen organizations with the clearest stake in improving the position of low-wage workersnamely unions"); Joseph Stiglitz, Markets and Morals, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2006, at 44
("The system has delivered enormous benefits for those at the top, but incomes at the bottom
have stagnated, or even declined."); Jeffrey Stinson, Europe's CEO pay lands in spotlight,
U.S.A. TODAY, June 30, 2008, at 3B (comparing German, French, and British CEO pay to the
pay of American CEOs); Philippe Waquet, The Role of Labour Law For IndustrialRestructuring, in OFFSHORING AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EMPLOYMENT, supra note 9, at 179
("Labor law ... aims to enable workers to participate in the life and future of undertakings
which are in operation thanks to their labor; it aims to ensure, without undermining management authority (which is actually more a responsibility), that workers have genuine guarantees
.. ..
.).
14 See generally THE FEDERALIST (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James Madison),
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan University Press, 1961) (1788).
15 See e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (2008) (arguing that federalism should be seen as an empowering doctrine, not a
doctrine imposing structural restraints on government); David A. Dana, Democratizing the
Law of Federal Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 507 (2008); Bradley W. Joondeph, Federalism, the Rehnquist Court, and the Modern Republican Party, 87 OR. L. REV. 117 (2008)
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mobile greenhouse emission standards,1 6 state tort and civil justice ac17
countability for prescription drug and medical device manufacturers,
the application of state law to the manufacture and marketing of cigarettes and other consumer products, 1 8 predatory lending practices by
banks and mortgage firms, 19 and immigration policy, 20 to name but a

few. As then-Professor Scalia once observed, federalism is "a stick that
can be used to beat either dog."' 21 Reversing positions from a generation
ago, progressives today often favor preserved state power, while business
interests often embrace federal authority as a shield against more stringent state regulations. 22 Moreover, in all of the aforementioned policy
areas, traditional objections to an all-knowing federal policy apparatus
merge with an appreciation for the role of state experimentation, flexibility, and power sharing in a more nuanced mix of governmental authority
and free markets. 23 Whether one focuses on environmental issues like
global warming, the preemption of state products liability for prescription drugs and medical devices by the Food and Drug Administration, or
immigration policy, federalism issues permeate public policy discourse
today.

24

(arguing that the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence aggressively enhanced state autonomy in
decisions construing the Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Amendment, and Section 5 of the
14th Amendment, but tacked in the opposite direction in federal statutory preemption and
Dormant Commerce Clause cases); William H. Pryor, Jr., Federalismand Freedom:A Critical
Review of Enhancing Government, 83 TULANE L. REV. 585 (2008); Erwin Chemerinsky, A
Troubling Trend in Preemption Rulings, TRIAL, May 2008, at 62; Adam Cohen, Editorial Observer, What Ever Happened to (the Good Kind ofp States' Rights?, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2008, at A24.
16 See, e.g., John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama's Order Likely to Tighten Auto Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at Al; Michael Hilitzik, Pushing Detroit Onto a Greener
Road, Los ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at Cl; Stephen Power, Obama's EPA Move Likely
to Spur Fight, THE WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2009, at A3.
17 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312
(2008); see The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 405 (2008)
(discussing Medtronic); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102
Nw. U. L. REV. 695 (2008).
18 See, e.g., Altria Group v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (tort claims for "light" cigarettes not preempted); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (state tort claims
concerning delay in standardizing use of auto airbags preempted); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
505 U.S. 504 (1992) (some state tort cigarette claims preempted, others not preempted).
19 See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
20 See generally Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local
Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (2008).
21 Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 19
(1982).
22 See, e.g., Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (prescription drugs); Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312
(2008) (medical devices); Grier, 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (automobiles).
23 See generally Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the
Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 469 (1993).
24 Then-Professor Scalia stated well the philosophy of shared federal and state power in a
federalist system: "[Federalism] is a form of government midway between two extremes. At
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Third, this larger federalism debate coincides with now well-known
doubts about the efficacy of the New Deal-era administrative agency
model of regulation. Agency capture by interest groups and the susceptibility to the cabining of administrative capacity through budget and staff
reductions, spring immediately to mind. 25 Nowhere is the federal agency
monopoly model of policy making more pronounced than in the lore and
reality of federal labor relations law. Significantly, much of the federal
labor law preemption doctrine rests substantially on the now outmoded
New Deal-era federal agency model. 26
Finally, a revision of labor law preemption doctrine presses on the
congressional agenda for reasons rooted in the constitutional division of
power between the states and the federal government. The states regulate the workplace relationship as "sister sovereigns" under the constitutional division of powers. 27 Only Congress, acting under the Commerce
Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, or other grant of constitutional authority, can choose to displace the constitutional division of authority between the states and the federal government under the Supremacy
Clause.2 8 Yet Congress remains largely silent on the issue of federal
labor law preemption. "The core reality in [labor law] preemption doctrine is judicial policy making in the face of congressional silence, disguised by the occasional cosmetic judicial divination of congressional
purpose and fabrication of intent. ' '29 Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing
for the majority in the seminal labor law preemption case, San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon,30 openly acknowledged in his opinion that labor law preemption doctrine involves a "more complicated and
perceptive process than is conveyed by the delusive phrase 'ascertaining
one extreme, the autonomy, the disunity, the conflict of independent states; at the other, the

uniformity, the inflexibility, the monotony of centralized governments. Federalism is meant to
be a compromise between the two." Scalia, supra note 21, at 19.
25 See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1741 (2008).
26 See infra Part IV.
27 See generally Drummonds, supra note 23. See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.

452, 457 (1999) (stating that "our Constitution established a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government").
28 See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1204-17 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment), and cases cited therein; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICms 234, 390-419 (3d ed. 2006) (overview of federal and state powers under
the constitution); David Savage, Thomas breaks with conservativejustices to criticize a Bushera policy, Los ANGELES Tir~ms, Mar. 8, 2009, at A3.
29 David Gregory, The Labor Law Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or
Last Hurrah?,27 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 507, 516-17 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). An
exception is Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006), giving the states
the power to adopt "right to work" laws outlawing the union shop, and overriding the express

authorization of such "union security" agreements in Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
30

San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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the intent of the legislature.' ,,31 As America again turns to the labor
relations question, it is time for Congress to speak on the central question
of federalism in labor relations policy.
In summary, though this is not the first call for reform in labor law
preemption doctrine, 32 the time is now uniquely ripe for revisiting this
issue. On the general issue of labor law reform, Professor Estlund
opined, "[I]t is manifestly unrealistic to expect Congress to step in to
correct judicial misinterpretation of the NLRA. '33 The Employee Free
Choice Act debate of 2007-2009 may prove this too pessimistic a prog34
nosis in changed circumstances. Yet whatever the fate of the EFCA,
devolution of some labor relations policy making authority to the states
cuts across traditional ideological divisions and would initiate an era of
innovation in labor relations policy, help to reverse the trend toward in36
come disparity, 35 and benefit the United States economy.

31 Id. at 239-241; cf Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (2008)
("The NLRA itself contains no express pre-emption provision .... ").
32 Several scholars have challenged the appropriateness of the current broad labor law
preemption doctrines marching under the New Deal-era banner of a uniform federal labor law
policy. See, e.g., Drummonds, supra note 23; Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1599-1600 (2002) [hereinafter Estlund, Ossification]; Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the Representation Gap, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391,
407-19 (2001); Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption:State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990); Eileen Silverstein, Against Preemption in
Labor Law, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial
Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective
BargainingSystem, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (1992). More recently, Paul Secunda has proposed
ways to fit state labor relations initiatives regarding captive audience issues into the existing
doctrinal framework. See Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to
Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 CoMP. LAB. L. AND
POL'Y J. 209 (2008); see also Catherine L. Fisk & Michael M. Oswalt, Preemptionand Civic
Democracy in the Battle Over Wal-Mart, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1502 (2008). For a view from an
economist's perspective, see Richard B. Freeman, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor
Relations Law?, LAB. AND EMP. REL. Ass'N PROC. OF THE 58T ANN. MEErING, Jan. 6-8,
2006, at 125, http://www.press.uillinois.eduljoumals/irralproceedings2006/freeman.html. To
date, however, none of these calls for a larger state role has received substantial congressional,
labor union, or management support.
33 Estlund, Ossification, supra note 32, at 1598.
34 Passage remains far from certain in light of the sixty votes needed in the U.S. Senate
to cut off debate. See Taylor E. Dark M, Prospectsfor Labor Law Reform, PERSPECTIVES ON
WORK, Summer 2008/Winter 2009, at 23.
35 E.g. Elizabeth Gudrais, Unequal America: Causes and consequences of the wide-and
growing-gap between rich and poor, HARV. MAG., July-Aug. 2008, at 22; see also Scott
Andron, Former Labor Secretary Robert Reich Critical of Stagnant Wages, MiAMi HERALD,
Feb. 12, 2009, at C1 (reporting on Reich's speech arguing that stagnant wages are America's
biggest trouble spot); Stiglitz, supra notes 9 and 11.
36 See supra notes 5, 10-11.
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THE DECLINE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONS AND THE FAILURES OF

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Private sector unionization in the United States rests on the tipping
point. 37 With only 7.6 percent 3 8 of the non-agricultural 39 private sector 4°
workforce represented by unions, 41 the EFCA may be the last desperate
chance for survival of private sector unions as significant institutions of
collective bargaining. 4 2 While the decline is less pronounced in certain
37 Writing in 1991, Professor James Gray Pope, writing about private sector unions and
the NLRA itself, referred to the long "slide toward oblivion." James Pope, The Past of Labor
Law-and Its Future, 39 UCLA L. REV. 481, 482 (1991) (reviewing WILLIAM E. FORBATH,
LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT

(1991)). Professor Estlund,

writing about labor law itself, referred to its "ossification" in 2002, Estlund, Ossification,
supra note 32, and to its "death" in 2006. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Death of Labor Law?, 2006
ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sc*. 2:105 [hereinafter Estlund, Death of Labor Law?]. Professor Gottesman has written of his "despair" for federal labor law. Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair,
Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHi-KENT L. REV. 59
(1993); see also James Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power,and Society, 44 MD. L. REv. 841
(1985) (analyzing impact of increasing concentration of capital on labor and the role of the law
in ignoring or thwarting union efforts to equalize bargaining power).
38 Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2008 1 (Jan. 28, 2009),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [hereinafter NLRB, Union Members in 2008].
39 The National Labor Relations Act excludes agricultural employment. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 152 (2006). Farm workers, however, bargain under state laws. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 23-1381-23-1395 (1995 & Supp. 2008); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-66 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 450.251-450.38 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009).
40 Public employees are excluded from the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). State
and local governmental employees, however, often bargain under state laws. See, e..g., Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/1-315/27 (West 2005 & Supp.
2009); Public Employees Fair Employment Act, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 2006); Public Employee Rights and Benefits, OR. RV. STAT. ANN. §§ 243.650-243.974
(West 2007). Federal employees bargain under a different federal act, the Federal Labor Relations Act, 5 USC §§ 7101-06, 7115-35 (2006).
41 In sharp contrast, 40.7 percent of public sector employees are organized, primarily
under state labor relations laws. See NLRB, Union Members in 2008, supra note 38, at tbl.3.
Note that union membership in the public sector was 36.8 percent and 7.6 percent in the
private sector. See id. at 1. Membership numbers are lower than representation numbers because not all the represented are union members.
42 Cf Paul Trapani, Old Presumptions Never Die: Rethinking the Steelworkers Trilogy's
Presumption of Arbitration in Deciding the Arbitrabiliy of Side Letters, 83 TULANE L. REV.
559, 560-61 (2008) (noting that the labor market of the 1950s and 1960s was "very different
from the one today ....
Unions are getting smaller and less capable of negotiating strong
contracts for their members .... [T]hese labor market changes threaten to depose the collective labor system and destabilize labor-management relations."). Of course, unions provide
benefits beyond collective bargaining representation. While private sector unions represent
relatively few employees in collective bargaining relationships, they remain a potent lobbying
force for worker-oriented legislation, such as the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-54 (2006), and in appealing to their members for support in political campaigns for
candidates friendly to the interests of employees generally. Further, unions reduce the information costs of employees learning about their rights under state and federal employment
statutes. See generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMEs L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONs Do?
(1984).
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industries like transportation and utilities, and telecommunications, 4 3 for
over 90 percent of American private sector workers, unionization is at
best an abstraction, irrelevant to their wages, hours, and working conditions. Significantly, those workers often look to statutory, tort, and contract law rights" under state law4 5 for remedies against unfair treatment.
The recent humbling of the United Autoworkers Union in being forced to
accept two-tier wage structures, cuts in benefits, and the severance of
more than half the workforce over the past ten years, 46 perpetuates the
perception of many employees that unions are pass6, and can lead to
pricing U.S. labor out of global markets. Moreover, the private sector
47
union decline began many years ago and shows few signs of abating.
Multiple factors explain this decline: the globalization of product
and labor markets, the change from a manufacturing to a service economy with white and pink collar job holders less receptive to unionization,
the "top-down" and bureaucratic organization of entrenched union leadership structures, the persistent problems of corruption in a few unions,
and the shift towards less adversarial workplace relationships, resulting
from the flattening of managerial hierarchies and work organized by employee teams (especially in the human resources strategies followed by
48
the "information technology" industries).

43 NLRB, Union Members in 2008, supra note 38, at 1 (noting that the industries with
the highest rates of unionization are transportation and utilities (22.2%), and telecommunications (19.3%.)).
44 E.g., Drummonds, supra note 23, at 479-83 and citations therein.
45 Most of the major federal employment statutes, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006), Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-78 (2006), Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.), and the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54
(2006), establish a minimum federal standard and do not preempt state regulation that is more
protective of employee interests.
46 See Micheline Maynard, Chrysler Says It Expects Contract Vote to be Close, N.Y.
TIMES,

Oct. 20, 2007, at C2.

47 Union representation and membership has gradually declined from a high of 35.1 per-

cent of private sector employment in the mid-1950s, at times plateauing for a few years, but
always resuming the general downward trend. See NEIL SHELFIN & LEO TROY, U.S. UNION
SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, FINANCES, STRUCTURE, DIRECTORY 3-20 (1985). The Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) is an exception to the trend of declining membership;
this union has adopted a strategy of avoiding NLRB processes and has encountered success in
its "Justice for Janitors" campaign and in the organizing of nursing home and home health care
workers. See SEIU, Justice for Janitors, http://www.seiu.org/division/property-services/ustice-for-janitors/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009); Steven Greenhouse, A Leader at the Point of
Union Growth and Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at A20 (discussing SEIU growth and
tactics). For a general discussion and analysis of the "representation gap," see RICHARD B.
FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (2006).
48 See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 34-55 (1993).
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In any discussion of private sector union decline, public sector
unionism must be compared. 49 While the private sector unions face near
extinction, 50 the flourishing of public sector unions stands in dramatic
contrast. 5' Unions represent 40.7 percent of public employees, five
times the rate of representation in the private sector. 52 This rise occurred
53
simultaneously with the decline in private sector unions.
With the exception of federal employees, public employees organize under state laws. 54 School teachers, police, nurses, road crews, department of motor vehicles employees, social workers, court clerks,
firefighters, corrections officers, and other employees of state and local
government join and support unions in the proportion enjoyed at the high
water-mark for private sector unionization in 1955. 55 These employees
enjoy substantial protection against anti-union discrimination, interference, and coercion through civil service and the vindication of civil
rights such as free speech and free association through 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims, whereby governmental managers who violate associational rights
can be sued individually for damages. 56 Further, jobs held by public
employees often cannot be easily shifted to other areas of the country or
abroad, though their work can sometimes be subcontracted out to the
private sector. 57 Many of the public employees who rally to union representation are service workers or hold pink or white collar jobs, sug49 See Stephen H. Kropp, Book Review, Reflections of Law, Economics, and Policy in
PublicSector Labor Relations in Canada,the United States, and the United Kingdom, 27 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 825, 825-26 (1996) ("There is an ongoing debate in legal and social
science scholarship regarding the reason for the precipitous decline in strength of private sector unions over the last twenty-five years, which has coincided with an increased vitality of
public sectors unions in the United States.").
50 See Barry T. Hirsch & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of PrivateSector Unionism: What Next for the NLRA?, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1137-39 (2007).
51 See Kropp, supra note 49, at 827.
52 See NLRB, Union Members in 2008, supra note 38, at tbl.3; supra notes 38 and 41,
and accompanying text.
53 See Kropp, supra note 49, at 827-31.
54 See Michelle R. Haubert-Barela, Correctingthe Imbalance: The New Mexico Public
Employee BargainingAct and the Statutory Rights Provided to Public Employees, 37 N.M. L.
REv. 357, 362 (2007).
55 Compare Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Worker's Rights to Self-organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1772 fig. l (1983), with Union Members 2008,
supra note 38, tbl.3.
56 See Daniel J. McDonald, A Primer on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, UTAH BAR J., May 1999 at
29, 32 ("Since individual-capacity suits do not impose any liability on the state, the Eleventh
Amendment is not implicated, though the named defendant holds public office, and though he
acted under color of state law. Thus, there is no Eleventh Amendment bar to an individualcapacity suit in federal court under §1983.").
57 See, e.g., Walter v. Scherzinger, 121 P.3d 644 (Or. 2005) (state labor board upheld
contracting out of janitorial services under state collective bargaining law, but Oregon Supreme Court held school district lacked authority to contract out janitorial services because of
wording of state civil service statute).
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gesting that there is nothing about those types of employees that prevent
their organization in the private sector as well. 5 8 Scholars and unionists
have asserted that unfavorable provisions in the National Labor Relations
Act (as amended by Taft-Hartley and interpreted in various Supreme
Court decisions over the past sixty years) have contributed significantly
to the decline in private sector unionism by "stacking the deck" against
59
employee choice of representation by unions.
What is the role of federal labor law, if any, in the long decline of
the private sector unions? Many argue that legal failings in the National
Labor Relations Act cannot fully explain the decline. 60 Managementside lawyers often argue that the law works to allow employees to exercise their free choice rights; since 1947, when the Taft-Hartley Act
granted employees an equal right to refrain from organizing their workplaces in unions, 6' unions have often lost elections, or, more often, failed
to gain enough support to obtain an election. The argument made in
these situations is that there is little demand for unions, and the employees made a rational choice to forgo union representation. The convictions of union lawyers and many scholars stand in sharp contrast; they
argue that the Act fails in its basic mission to safeguard employees from
anti-union discrimination, to protect and foster a meaningful bargaining
process, and to provide effective remedies for unfair labor practicesexcept those committed by unions. 62 Indeed, leading labor law academ58 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59 U.
CHi. L. REV. 575, 581-82 (1992); see also Weiler, supra note 55, at 1773 n.6.
59 See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace In Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 324 n.15 (2005) ("[T]his pessimism stems from the fact that
the right to form a union is perhaps the most trampled upon and under-enforced of employees'
legal rights."); Atleson, supra note 37; James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card
Check Recognition: Prospectsfor Changing Paradigms,90 IowA L. REV. 819 (2005); Richard
Freeman, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union Organizing Drives, 43 INDUST. & LABOR
REL. REV. 351 (1990); Weiler, supra note 55 at 1772-74.
60 See, e.g., Michael L. Wachler, Labor Unions: A CorporatistInstitution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 583 (2007) ("I argue that the cause of this unrelenting
decline is a single, fundamental factor-the change in the United States economy from a corporatist-regulated economy to one based on free competition. Most labor commentators have
explained the decline by a confluence of unrelated economic and legal forces.").
61 See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006); NLRB v. Drivers,
Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274, 279-80 (1960) ("[T]he Taft-Hartley
Act added another right of employees . . . namely, the right to refrain from joining a union
. ..

. ").

62 A right of damages for union secondary boycotts, and certain other unfair labor practices by unions, but not employer unfair labor practices, was created in the Taft-Hartley Act.
See 29 U.S.C. § 187 (2006). Additionally, Section 10(1) of the Taft-Hartley-amended NLRA
requires NLRB investigators who have reasonable belief that a union is engaging in unfair
labor practices to seek injunctive action against the union in federal district court. See id.
§ 160(1). Other unfair labor practices, including all those involving employer violations, fall
under the discretionary powers of the NLRB provided by NLRA Section 10(j), which allows,
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ics have openly despaired that the labor law itself is "dead" or "ossified."' 63 This Article does not intend to answer the question raised by
these two views in the labor union decline debate.
Instead this Article focuses on two more immediately relevant questions in the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) debate: (1) Is it desirable
from a policy standpoint to rebalance the labor laws to encourage more
representation of private sector employees by unions, and (2) will the
EFCA have this effect? In this formulation, the question is less "did
federal labor law contribute to the decline" and more "can and should
federal labor law be utilized to reverse the decline in collective representation, and can state law play an important role as it does in so many
other areas of the law of the workplace?"
III.

THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT

The Employee Free Choice Act raises three fundamental issues of
labor relations policy: (1) what process should exist for unions to legitimately demonstrate their majority support among employees; (2) what
process should exist for resolving bargaining disputes other than such
devices as strikes, permanent replacement of strikers, lockouts, and unilateral implementation of employer bargaining demands; and (3) should
employers face stronger penalties for unfair labor practices, such as antiunion activity discrimination, as they now face for racial, gender, religious, national origin, disabilities, and, often under state law, sexual orientation discrimination?
A.

The Process of DemonstratingA Union Majority
1. The Background of the EFCA

American labor law rests upon the assumption that the majority of
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit freely chose to be represented. 64 Once that majority status has been demonstrated, the employer
must bargain in good faith regarding compensation issues, hours, and
but does not require, injunctive relief to be sought upon complaint of unfair labor practices.
See id. § 16 0 0). Section 100) injunctions were sought by the NLRB against employers in only
twenty cases out of 16,291 unfair labor practices complaints filed in 2007. See NLRB, SEV-

ENTY-SECOND

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FIscAL

YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, at 5, 93 (2007) [hereinafter NLRB ANNUAL REPORT].
63 See, e.g., Estlund, Ossification, supra note 32; Estlund, Death of Labor Law?, supra
note 37; Gottesman, supra note 37.
64 See Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee Representation, 69 CHL-KENT L. REv. 195, 197 (1993) ("Section 7 [of the NLRA]

gives employees the right to representatives 'of their own choosing'-not of someone else's
choosing, whether that someone else is the employer or a group of co-workers. Such was a
tenable reading of Section 7(a) of the NLRA, until the then National Labor Relations Board
adopted the requirement of majority rule giving the 'their' of 'their own choosing' a collective
rather than individual reference.").
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other terms and conditions of employment such as job security and grievance and arbitration procedures.
During the middle third of the twentieth century, labor unions often
demonstrated their majority support via "authorization cards" signed by
the employees stating their wish for union representation. Absent good
faith doubt in the validity of the card majority, an employer was then
obligated to bargain with the union. 65 During the late 1960s and early
1970s, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) gradually shifted to
the view that employers should have the right to insist, instead, on a
secret ballot election; this view was enshrined in the national labor policy
by a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court in 1974.66 In light of this development, contemporary unions have won about half the election cam67
paigns culminating in an NLRB-conducted election.
Yet, as research conducted by Professor Richard Freeman and
others has consistently shown, employees have indicated in polls and
public opinion surveys that they would prefer union representation at far
higher percentages than they are actually represented. 68 What can explain the "representation gap"? 69 Two theories compete for the answer.
a.

A Critique of the Present System

Unions claim that several factors make NLRB elections problematic
as devices for ascertaining the unfettered choice of employees. First,
elections automatically delay the collective bargaining process by
months. 70 This delay not only affects the particular election, but also has
65 See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 592 (1969) ("The traditional
approach utilized by the Board for many years has been known as the Joy Silk doctrine ....
Under that rule, an employer could lawfully refuse to bargain with a union claiming representative status through possession of authorization cards if he had a 'good faith doubt' as to the
union's majority status; instead of bargaining he could insist that the union seek an election in
order to test out his doubts.") (citing Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949)).
66 See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
67 ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 108 (14th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter Cox] (summarizing data from NLRB reports showing that since 1990, union success rates have fluctuated in the range of 47 percent to 52 percent). In addition to recognition
based on union authorization card majorities and NLRB-conducted elections, the third way a
union can establish bargaining rights under current law is through the so-called "'Gissel" remedy. A "Gissel order" allows the NLRB to award bargaining rights to a union upon a finding
of egregiously unfair labor practices that have destroyed the possibility of an untainted election. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Gissel remedies are relatively
rare; only three such cases came before the NLRB in 2007. See NLRB ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 62, at 89. Further, the courts of appeal have often been hostile to the enforcement
of bargaining orders. See, e.g., NLRB v. Goya Foods, 525 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2008).
68 See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 47, at 19-20 (analyzing Hart Research Surveys
indicating that 53 percent of American workers said they favored union representation); Richard B. Freeman, Do Workers Want Still Want More Unions? More Than Ever, Economic
Policy Institute (Feb. 22, 2007), http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp182/bpl82.pdf.
69 Estlund, Ossification, supra note 32, at 1528.
70 See Weiler, supra note 55, at 1777.
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negative ex ante affects on potential organizing, because employees
know they are particularly vulnerable during a hotly contested election
campaign that can drag on for months. Second, elections allow the em71
ployer to wage a "campaign" against unionization with the employees.
Under the Taft-Hartley-amended NLRA, infringement of free speech
cannot be an unfair labor practice, or even evidence of unfair labor prac72
tices absent a threat of reprisal or promise of a benefit.
Third, a union election campaign is far from the equal contest of
stylized political elections; the employer-not the union-has the "fist in
the velvet glove" 73 of economic power over the employees. Union organizers have no right of access to the workplace absent special circumstances. 74 An employer can restrict employee "union talk" and
solicitation to non-work times, while simultaneously requiring "captive
audience" meetings with employees and supervisors to campaign against
the union during work time, absent special circumstances. 75 In addition,
71 See id. at 1777-78.
72 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006) ("The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof ...shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice...
if such expression contains no threat or reprisal or force or promise of benefit."). In Chamber
of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S.Ct. 2408 (2008), the Supreme Court noted that the addition of
this section "is indicative of how important Congress deemed such 'free debate' that Congress
amended the NLRA rather than leaving to the courts the task of correcting the NLRB's decisions on a case by case basis," and characterized the policy judgment as "factoring uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open debate in labor disputes.
...
Id. at 2413-14 (internal quotations
omitted).
73 See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) ("The danger inherent in
well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees
are not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is also the source
from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged."). On the onesidedness of NLRB election processes generally, see Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and FederalLabor Law, 77 MINN. L. REv. 495 (1993);
Brudney, supra note 59.
74 See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992). Justice Thomas, writing for the
majority, stated that for a non-employee union organizer to be granted access to the workplace,
the union must show "'that no other reasonable means of communicating its organization
message to the employees exist or that the employer's access rules discriminate against union
solicitation,"' and further noted this was a "heavy burden." Id. at 535 (quoting Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. S.D. County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978)). In assessing
whether the union had reasonable access off the premises to the shopping center's employees,
the majority refused to follow the NLRB's finding that reasonable alternative access was not
available, alluding to the union's success in learning the names and addresses of about twenty
percent of the employees by copying down auto license numbers and obtaining the names and
addresses from the DMV; the other employees, opined the majority, could be reached by signs
as they drove onto the shopping center property, or through newspaper advertisements. See id.
at 530, 540. Ironically, the Third Circuit recently held that a union could be liable for compensatory and punitive damages under a federal privacy statute for unauthorized use of DMV
information. See Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008).
75 NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process and the State of Labor-Management Relations: the Role
of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L. J. 461, 484 (2007); Secunda, supra note 32,
at 214-15. "A recent federal government report studied four hundred union elections and
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an employer can deny use of company email for union-related communications, while generally allowing personal use of the email system. 76 In
most cases, factual misrepresentations do not invalidate election reSUitS, 7 7 and threats of reprisal are distinguished from mere employer
"predictions" about the adverse consequences of unionization using doctrinal tests far removed from the shop or office floor. 78 These rules often
make it hard for unions to have direct access to employees to make the
case for unionization. The NLRB election process is, thus, far from an
"equal opportunity" contest. 79
Fourth, discrimination against union supporters and leaders among
the employee cohort, while illegal in theory, 80 is hard to prove in practice, and occurs far too often, according to empirical studies by Professor
Paul Weiler and others. 81 Additionally, the remedy for illegal anti-union
firings is weaker than for most other forms of discrimination. Whereas
discrimination based on race, national origin, sex, religion, freedom of
speech of public employees, and, in many states, 82 sexual orientation,
gives rise to compensatory damages (including emotional distress) 83 and
even punitive damages, 84 anti-union firings result, after a process that
often lasts years, in mere reinstatement with back pay, minus the employee's earnings during the period of legal dispute. 85 For most reinstated employees, life has moved on in the years of litigation, and they
decline reinstatement. 86 Furthermore, many who do accept reinstatement
continue to suffer discrimination, and most wind up resigning within a
year or two. 87 Employees as well as employers must consider these
weak remedies. If there is little downside risk of ridding the workplace
of agitating union supporters, then a rational calculation of costs and ben88
efits may weigh in favor of illegal action.
found that 92% of these union campaigns involved employers forcing employees to attend
captive audience meetings." Secunda, supra note 32 at 215.
76 See, e.g., The Guard Publ'g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1116 (2007).
77 See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 129 (1982).
78 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
79 See Becker, supra note 73, at 601; see also Brudney, supra note 59.
80 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (2006).
81 See Weiler supra note 55.
82 See, e.g., OR. REv.STAT. § 659A.030(1) (2007); see also Mark A. Rothstein, EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIApLs 386 n.5 (6th ed. 2007) ("About half the states ... have
enacted laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.").

83 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 includes emotional distress damages).
84 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.885(3)(a), (6)(a).
85 See Weiler, supra note 55, at 1787.
86 See Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1988).
87 See Cox, supra note 67, at 266-267.
88 Cf.Weiler, supra note 55, at 1769-70.
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In summary, the dynamics of NLRB elections and union organizing

campaigns are far from the "free and fair" political elections that first
come to the mind's eye in our society. The lack of equal access and
other rules tilt the process in favor of employers trying to deter and prevent unionization.8 9 Thus, top officials of the AFL-CIO have opined that
unions would now be better off without federal labor law as it stands
now, 90 a far cry from the union optimism that accompanied initial passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. 9 1 Tellingly, management lawyers and private sector employers now see federal labor law as
approaching perfection.

b.

92

The Response to the Critique

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and many employer associations
often ask, "Is the card majority process really superior to secret ballot
elections in ascertaining the unfettered choice of employees for or
against union representation?

' 93

Are the consistent votes against unions

in over half of all NLRB elections really the product of an unfair process
and employer coercion, or do employees who have heard both sides of
the argument simply prefer not to unionize? Perhaps employees sign
union cards out of embarrassment or peer pressure. Perhaps they decide
they do not wish to pay union dues and initiation fees. Perhaps employees, when they think about it, conclude that unionization will not make
them, or the goods and services they produce, more valuable in the
89 See Stanley A. Gacek, Revisiting the Corporatistand Constructivist Models of Labor
Law Regimes: A Review of the Brazilian and American Systems, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 39
(1994).
90 See Richard L. Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 871, 881
(1987) ("I say abolish the Act."); Bureau of National Affairs, Kirkland Says Many Unions
Avoiding NLRB, DAILY LAB. REP., Aug. 1989, at A-I 1-12 (former AFL-CIO President "would
prefer 'no law' to the current labor statutes ....").
91 See Terry Collingsworth, Resurrecting the National Relations Act-Plant Closing and
Runaway Shops in a Global Economy, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 72, 76-77 (1993).
92 See, e.g., Estlund, Ossification, supra note 32, at 1543-44. For example, when President Clinton appointed the "Dunlop Commission" in 1993 to study and make recommendations about changes in labor law, the main proposal of management was to make changes in a
relatively obscure provision outlawing company unions but having the effect of restricting
"employee involvement" committees sponsored by employers. See Cox, supra note 67, at
1100-01. The proposed changes were supported by some scholars but opposed by others.
Compare Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition:
The Casefor Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 125 (1994)
(supporting changes), with Michael Harper, The Continuing Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the
ContemporaryWorkplace, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2322 (1998). The point here is not to take sides
in this particular dispute, but rather to make two different points: (l)management has grown
comfortable with the NLRB system, and (2) here again is an area of law that might profit from
state experimentation. For the current state of the law on "company unions," see generally
Electromation, Inc. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), affTd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
93 See Brudney, supra note 59, at 841-42.

20091

BEYOND THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT

global marketplace. In short, employers involved in the EFCA debate
argue there is no problem to fix.
Who is right? This is not an easy question to answer. It is possible
that more experimentation at the state level could help answer the question. If fairer union election procedures (such as equal access, no captive
audience speeches, and protection against union discrimination on par
with that of other forms of discrimination) found support in non-preempted state laws, a fact-based answer would be closer at hand.
2.

An Alternative Solution: The Neutrality Agreement

Having lost faith in the fairness of the present election system, some
unions have sought alternatives bypassing the NLRB election process
altogether. A major initiative of several unions has been the "neutrality
agreement," sometimes referred to as a "labor peace agreement. '94 In
this scenario, which unions have used successfully in several organizing
campaigns including the Justice for Janitors campaigns, 95 the union puts
pressure on an employer to agree in advance to remain neutral in a subsequent organizing campaign, and, in some versions, to accept a later card
majority process in lieu of the NLRB election process. There are several
reasons an employer would agree to such a neutrality agreement: (1) the
union might put economic pressure on the employer via publicity campaigns aimed at consumers or other businesses; (2) it might promise cooperation in the gaining of governmental subsidies; (3) it might make
concessions in contract negotiations for already represented employees in
the belief that the long term interest of all represented employees depends on continued organizing of the unrepresented; (4) it might engage
in a "corporate campaign" to convince union pension funds, other shareholders, and directors that neutrality agreements should be encouraged
for reasons of ideology or pragmatism; and (5) a union might prevail on
local or state governments to require a neutrality agreement as a condi96
tion for a state or local contract.
Two developments, however, endanger this new strategy from the
unions' point of view. First, in one of the last decisions made while
President George W. Bush's appointees constituted a majority on the National Labor Relations Board, a 3-2 majority held, in Dana Corporation,
that an election can be forced if a decertification petition is supported by
a minimum of 30 percent of the employees within forty-five days from a
voluntary recognition of a union card majority. 97 This threatens to delay
the fragile bargaining process at a critical time. As explained by the two
94 See Brudney, supra note 59, at 825-26.

95 See Justice for Janitors, supra note 47.
96 See infra Part V.
97 See Dana Corporation, 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 443 (2007).
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dissenters, the ruling reversed prior Board precedent barring a challenge
to a union's majority status for a "reasonable period" following an employer's voluntary recognition of a union as representative based on a
98
union card majority.
The second development arises from the Supreme Court's June
2008 decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, which struck down
California's law restricting the use of profits from state contracts by employers during union organizing campaigns. 99 The Court's majority
opinion used language that suggests employees have an affirmative right
to hear an employer's arguments against unionization. 100 The decision
goes beyond the literal language of Section 8(c) of the NLRA and arguably makes otherwise lawful neutrality agreements illegal and unenforceable, since such agreements essentially waive this asserted employee
statutory right. 10 1 Enter the Employee Free Choice Act.
3. The Solution Proposed in the Employee Free Choice Act
The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) would allow a union to
demonstrate its majority status via union authorization cards, and would
10 2
give employers no option to insist on an NLRB election campaign.
Instead, the NLRB would be required to certify the union as representative of the employees upon a showing that a majority had signed cards
authorizing that representation. 10 3 It should be noted that several state
laws for public and private employees already allow the "card majority"
process, a further indicator of the value of experimentation and flexibility
10 4
of labor relations policy in the states.
4.

Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act

But what if employer contentions that card majorities unreliably
gauge employee support, and that employees often simply change their
minds when they learn more about the pros and cons of union representation, prove correct? Will the card majority process central to the Employee Free Choice Act trap employees who change their minds as they
98 Id. at 445-47.
99 See Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct 2408 (2008).
100 See id. at 2413-14.
101 The argument is sketched in more detail by a lawyer in a prominent management-side
firm. See Douglas A. Darch & Shaw Seyforth, The End of Neutrality Agreements?, LAw360,

Aug. 4 2008, http://www.law360.com/articles/64797.
102 See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2009).
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE 71636.3 (West 2009) (public); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
150A §§ 2(12), 5 (LexisNexis 2008) (private); Mmi. STAT. ANN. § 179.16 (West 2006) (private); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:1 (XII) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 243.682(2)(a) (2007) (public); County of Du Page v. Ill. Lab. Bd., 900 N.E.2d 1095, 1103
(D. Ill. 2008)) (public);
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learn more about the collective bargaining process? This is a fair
question.
One solution springs from the public sector laws that already have
card majority processes. That is, to allow a "window period" for employees, not the employer, to request an election.10 5 This might still present opportunities for delay and employer encouragement of election
petitions by employees, but such actions could be handled by unfair labor
06
practice proceedings and other safeguards. Where at least 50 percent
of the employees wish to determine the representation question via a secret ballot, the union's card majority is called into doubt. Further, as a
practical matter, if 50 percent or more of the employees want to vote, the
union will not be in a strong enough bargaining position with the employer until it convinces a strong majority to support the union. While
employee election petitions might invite employer mischief, such as
threatening or encouraging employees to seek an election, such behavior
could be overcome if employers were held accountable for bribing or
threatening employees. Furthermore, the union, presumptively enjoying
majority support via its card majority, should have equal access to the
employees during the window for an employee election request. Rather
than the forty-five days provided in Dana Corporation,0

7

a shorter pe-

riod of, say, fourteen days, should suffice to allow represented employees to decide if they want an election.
Another, more fundamental, approach would be to take a step back
and consider the majority status question in far broader sweep. One of
the oddities of labor law is that inordinate attention is placed on the
union's majority status at one moment of time (e.g., the day of an election, the day a card majority arises, or the day an employer withdraws
union recognition), and then the majority status question is ignored altogether for long periods. A union's ascendency as lawful majority representative triggers an irrebuttable presumption of continued majority
status for a period of time, and then a rebuttable presumption of majority
105 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.682 (2)(3) (2007) (mandating that 30 percent of

employees may force an election). In 2007, a similar procedure was required by the NLRB in
a hotly debated 3-2 split decision involving voluntary recognition of the union's majority after
the employer signed a "neutrality" agreement with the union agreeing not to oppose unionization. See Dana Corporation, 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 443 (2007). Under Dana Corporation,30
percent of the employees may force an election during the forty-five days after an employer's

voluntary recognition, notwithstanding the union's card majority. See Henry Drummonds, The
Union Authorization Card Majority Debate, 58 LAB. L. J. 217, 221-22 (2007).
106 In Dana Corporation, the NLRB's General Counsel, as an amicus curiae, advocated
for the window period adopted by the Board majority, but would have required the employee

election petition be supported by 50 percent of the employees on the theory that only that
would seriously call into question the union's earlier card majority. See 351 N.L.R.B. at 436.

The NLRB majority, however, rejected this suggestion and allowed an election upon a petition
supported by only 30 percent of the employees.
107 See id. at 441.
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status that does not expire.' 0 8 This indifference to a union's actual continued majority support finds its most extreme expression in cases that
hold a union contract blocks a majority status challenge even where the
employees overwhelmingly express opposition to union representation
the day after the union has telegraphed its acceptance of an employer
offer after an unsuccessful strike,' °9 or where the Board refuses to assume that replacement workers for striking unionized employees oppose
the striking union in higher proportion than the strikers." 0
Of course, important policy considerations underlie the presumption
of continued majority status, such as the need to not undercut the representative work of the union by allowing continual challenges to its majority status, and the need for stability in collective bargaining
relationships even from an employer perspective. The point is that the
focus, in the EFCA debate, on whether the union actually represents a
majority on the date it asserts a card majority, or on whether majority
status can better be ascertained on the date of an NLRB election, is not
the only question about majority status that must be addressed.
Consider two examples of how a less-cabined discussion might unfold. One could imagine, for example, a system in which employees
were periodically asked, as in political elections, to renew or withdraw
their support for union representation. Of course, a more equal and balanced election process would be required. Although this suggestion
might well be labeled nafve and unrealistic by many of this writer's
union friends, it would hold labor law true to its pretensions that majority
support of employees provides the foundational legitimacy to the union's
representative claims. Further, it might help unions achieve more bargaining power by having a periodically renewed and affirmative mandate
for representation. Or, even more fundamentally, labor law could allow
non-exclusive or "minority" representation of employees who choose to
join a union while allowing the non-union majority of that same employer to go unrepresented; that is, accept the suggestions of several
108 When a union wins an election, a "certification bar" prevents any challenge to a
union's majority status, even by the represented employees, for a period of one year; where an
employer recognizes a union voluntarily based on a card majority, an irrebuttable presumption
of continued majority status continues for a "reasonable time." See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S.
96, 98-99 (1954). Moreover, the "contract bar" prevents challenges to a union's majority
status, absent unusual circumstances, at any time during a collective bargaining agreement for
up to 3 years, except during a thirty-day "window" period. See Gen. Extrusion Co., 121
N.L.R.B. 1165, 1167 (1958) (enumerating certain exceptions to doctrine); Deluxe Metal Furniture, 121 NLRB 995, 999-1006 (1958); see also Cox, supra note 67, at 219-21.
109 See, e.g., Auciello Iron Works Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 783-86 (1996).
110 See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Sci. Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 788-94 (1990) (holding

that NLRB's refusal to adopt presumption that strike replacements oppose union was rational
and consistent with the NLRA); Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1344 (1987) (refusing to
adopt a presumption that strike replacement oppose a striking union).
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scholars that unions might reestablish credibility with a broader crosssection of workers by first representing their members, and only their
members, in non-exclusive bargaining arrangements.' l
As with the question of card-check or election majorities that frame
much of the EFCA debate, proposals for members-only representation,
or periodic union representation elections, generate no easy answer. Yet
the possibilities for experimentation and innovation beckon in a field
that, in the words of Professor Cynthia Estlund, suffers from extreme
"ossification." 112 In short, if the goal is to revitalize the union representation movement in the private sector, there are many ideas that are not
part of the current EFCA debate that could be explored, but the chances
of a national consensus seem remote.
B.

The Processfor Resolving Bargaining Disputes

1. The Change Proposed in the Employee Free Choice Act
The Employee Free Choice Act proposes interest arbitration 1 3 as a
mechanism for resolving bargaining disputes over the terms of first contracts.ll4 This would constitute a major change in the philosophy of collective bargaining enshrined in federal labor law.
As the Supreme Court has noted, the New Deal-era federal labor
relations statutes embedded private ordering as a fundamental premise of
our labor law: "Congress intended that the parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by any governmental power to
regulate the substantive solution for their differences."' " 15
111 See Charles J. Morris, Minority Union Collective Bargaining:A Commentary on John
True's Review Essay on The Blue Eagle at Work, and a Reply to Skeptics RegardingMembersOnly BargainingUnder the NLRA, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 179, 180 (2006) (book
review); Christine Neylon O'Brien, When Union Members in a Members-Only Non-Majority
Union (MONMU) Want Weingarten Rights: How High Will the Blue Eagle Fly?, 10 U. PA. J.
Bus. & EMP. L. 599, 600 (2008); Clyde Summers, Unions Without a Majority-A Black Hole?,
66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 531, 541-45 (1990). Several unions also have also supported the idea of
non-majority representation. See Steven Greenhouse, Seven Unions Ask Labor Board To Order Employers to Bargain, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 15 2007, at A14.
112 Estlund, Ossification, supra note 32, at 1530.
113 Interest arbitration differs from grievance arbitration. See DONALD H. WOLLET ET AL.,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

321-22 (4th ed. 1993) (referring to griev-

ance arbitration as "conventional arbitration" and to interest arbitration as "final-offer" arbitration). In grievance arbitration, which is common under collective bargaining contracts, an
arbitrator chosen jointly by the union and employer resolves disputes over the meaning or
application of an existing collective bargaining contract. Id. By contrast, interest arbitration
resolves disputes over what a not-yet-existing contract should say; in essence, the interest
arbitrator writes the contract in areas where the parties cannot reach agreement at the bargaining table. Id.
114 See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 2009).
115 NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960) (citing Local 24 Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959)).
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The EFCA's interest arbitration provision would both change this
private ordering premise and leave it intact. It would change private ordering by requiring a neutral third party resolve bargaining disputes in
"first contract" situations-the resulting contract would be the product of
the third party's choice instead of that of the parties to the contract. At
the same time, the government would not be directly involved in establishing the terms of the contract, and the interest arbitration process
would apply only in newly established bargaining relationships with subsequent contract negotiations reverting to the unfettered private ordering
model.
2.

The Current Balance of Power in Bargaining Disputes

To evaluate the debate about first contract interest arbitration, one
must again consider the current law. Once a union has established majority status, the employer and union must bargain in good faith. Failure
6 The obligation
to do so constitutes an unfair labor practice. 11
to bargain
in good faith, however, does not carry an obligation to agree or make
concessions. 1 7 The remedy for "bad faith" bargaining is generally a
cease and desist order from the NLRB, enforceable by further petition to
a federal court of appeals. 1 8 Since this process often takes years to play
out, the remedy for bad faith, or "surface" bargaining, entails the proverbial "slap on the wrist."'119 While collective bargaining in established
relationships often results in agreements in which the parties have fashioned their own terms regarding compensation, hours, and working conditions, the success rate for bargaining in first contract negotiations
involving newly established union representation is lower. 120 In either
established or first contract situations, however, the parties can reach an
"impasse," a breakdown in negotiations, removing any realistic chance
that further discussion will close the gap between the parties' positions.
At impasse, both the union and employer may, under current law,
resort to certain self-help remedies in the nature of economic warfare. 12 1
For employees represented by unions, the primary options at a bargaining impasse are: (1) working without a contract, (2) striking for a better
116 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (2006).
117 See id. § 158(d).

118 See id. § 160(a), (f).
119 See H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102-06 (1970); see also NLRB v. General
Electric, 418 F.2d 736, 738-49 (2d Cir. 1969) (noting that the decision came "[a]lmost ten
years after the events that gave rise to [the] controversy").
120 See Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospectsfor
Union Representation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 351, 354 (1984) ("Only slightly more than 60% of
newly certified units achieve a collective agreement ....").
121 Indeed, though relatively rare, the parties may resort to economic pressure during bargaining. See, e.g., Am. Shipbldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 301-02 (1965); NLRB v. Ins.
Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 479 (1960).
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contract offer, but risking replacement, or (3) engaging in unconventional tactics such as a slowdown, sit-down, or intermittent strike, but
risking being firing, as unconventional strikes stand unprotected under
federal labor law. 122 For employers, the primary options at impasse are:
(1) locking out the employees to pressure them and the union to come to
terms,1 2 3 (2) temporarily or permanently replacing striking employees
and continuing operations, 124 or (3) unilaterally implementing its final
12 5
contract offer if the employees remain at work.
The balance of economic power generally favors employers. Most
students of labor law can readily understand the temptation for employers to purposefully pursue an impasse strategy in negotiations, especially
in the fragile situation of a new bargaining relationship, since the remedies for bad faith bargaining are minimal. Further, even without abuse of
the process, the parties may simply fail to reach agreement. In general,
employers fare better in economic warfare than employees represented
by unions. Large corporations can consider redirecting capital investment to other domestic and international locales where collective bargaining is not established, or spend more on robotics, information
systems, and other technologies that decrease their need for labor. With
the economic power of private sector unions declining, federal labor law
fails to provide either a significant legal or practical self-help remedy
when employers abuse the bargaining process, or a balanced set of selfhelp remedies for resolving bargaining disputes when they do not.
3.

Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act

Many have suggested that the permanent replacement of strikers,
which has been lawful since the 1938 Mackay case, 12 6 tips the balance
122 See, e.g., Int'l Union v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 252-60
(1949); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253-57 (1939). Another unconventional tactic is for the employees to continue to work and perform their duties, but no more
than that; this is sometimes called "work to the rule." See, e.g., Local 702 IBEW v. NLRB,
215 F.3d 11, 16-18 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that an employer's lockout was not illegal, and
that the union's "inside game" strategy did not involve protected activity).
123 See, e.g., Local 15 IBEW v. NLRB, 429 F.3d 651, 659-61 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing
NLRB ruling holding employer's use of partial lockout did not violate NLRA); Bunting Bearings Co., 343 N.L.R.B. 479 (2004) (holding post-impasse lockout not unlawful).
124 See, e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); see also
Cox, supra note 67, at 585-88.
125 See, e.g., Duffy Tool & Stamping L.L.C. v. NLRB, 233 F.3d 995, 999 (7th Cir. 2000);
Visiting Nurse Servs. of W. Mass., Inc., v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 52, 57-58 (1st Cir. 1999).
126 See Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46. Though the NLRA is silent on permanent
replacement, and affirmatively gives employees a statutory right to engage in "concerted activity for mutual aid and protection," 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006), this seminal case, decided just
three years after the original enactment of the NLRA, rather casually assumed a right of permanent replacement in dictum, holding that an employer could not pick and choose who to
bring back to work on the basis of their support for a strike. See James Pope, How American
Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REv. 518, 527-34 (2004).
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too far in favor of employers. 12 7 Strikes pressure both employers and
employees to find a path to settlement. 12 8 An employer can try to continue operating with replacement workers, but to do so may involve
training and productivity costs. The striking employees must do without
a paycheck, and, in most states, are not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. 2 9 Thus, both sides suffer during a strike, and both sides
can win or lose the strike. An employer may be forced to agree to terms
it wanted to avoid, after calculating that continued strike losses outweigh
the benefits of continued resistance to the employees' and union's proposal. Similarly, the employees and the union may, and often do, lose a
strike. It is entirely consistent with NLRA policy for the employees and
union to throw in the towel and abandon the strike if the costs, particularly loss of income, outweigh the perceived benefits of continued
striking.
Permanent strike replacement changes this calculus of costs and
benefits. After President Reagan successfully and permanently replaced
more than 10,000 striking air traffic controllers in 1981, the use and
threat of permanent replacements in strike situations became more common.' 30 While Section 7 of the NLRA protects strikes over collective
bargaining disputes, making it illegal for employers to retaliate or discriminate against employees for striking, employers may permanently replace striking employees. Even if employees are willing to end the
strike, the employer is not obligated to allow them return to work if permanent replacements have been hired, or if strikers who crossed the
picket line before cessation of the strike have taken the place of the strik-

127 The literature on this point is vast. See, e.g., J. GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14
224-28 (1998); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 198-205 (1993); Charles Craver, The National Labor Relations
Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 397, 406-07 (1992);

William B. Gould, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can
Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-ManagementRelations Law in the United States,

43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 297 (2008); Michael C. Harper, A Frameworkfor the Rejuvenation of
the American Labor Movement, 76 IND. L J. 103 (2001); Joseph P. Norelli, PermanentReplacement: Time for a New Look, 24 LABOR LAWYER 97, 99-106 (2008); Weiler, Striking a
New Balance, supra note 120, at 387-94.
128 Strikes have ex ante effects as well. The possibility of a "lose, lose" strike propels the
parties toward moderation and the search for common ground in contract bargaining in order
to avoid a strike. Cox, supra note 67, at 506.
129 Cf. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 534 (1979) ("Unlike
most states, New York has concluded that the community interest in the security of persons
directly affected by a strike outweighs the interest in avoiding any impact on a particular labor
dispute.").
130 See Stephen F. Bedfort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rv. 351, 440-41 (2002); Joseph A. Martin, The
Anniversary Everybody Forgets, HIST. NEWS SERV., August 11, 2001, at 2.
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ers who honored the strike picket line to the bitter end.' 3 ' Many a union
lawyer, explaining these distinctions to employees contemplating
whether to strike, have faced the incredulous responses of employees
who quite naturally ask, "You mean the labor law protects me in striking,
132
but I can still lose my job?"'

One possibility for restoring a balance of power to the bargaining
impasse situation would be to eliminate permanent replacement. In
1991, the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives passed the
Workplace Fairness Act, 133 which would have banned the permanent replacement of strikers in most situations, but the bill died in the Senate
under threat of a filibuster. 134 President Clinton then, by Executive Order, provided that employers that were parties to governmental procurement contracts could lose their government contracts if they utilized
permanent replacements in their labor relations, but this Order was struck
1 35
down by the Court of Appeals.
Whether providing for first contract interest arbitration or eliminating permanent replacement of strikers constitutes the best way to try to
rebalance the remedies for resolving bargaining disputes is fairly debatable. Again, allowing some variance and experimentation at the state
level appears essential.
Further, assuming that interest arbitration for first contracts is the
method chosen, what particular interest arbitration procedure would
work best? One option would be for the parties to present all their positions to the arbitrator, and allow the arbitrator discretion to write the
contract. A second option would be to have each party present their own
proposal for each disputed subject and have the arbitrator choose one of
the parties' proposals for each subject, or "final offer by item arbitration." Still a third option would be to have each party present the entire
package of their contract offers to the arbitrator and require the arbitrator
to choose one package or the other, also known as "final offer package
arbitration." Obviously, the pressures and bargaining strategies of the
parties will vary depending on the type of interest arbitration chosen.
131 See Trans World Airlines v. Indep. Fed'n or Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 433-37
(1989).
132 The answer to that question is technically "no." Permanently replaced emqiployees are
entitled to go onto a preferential rehiring list for vacancies which occur within one year of their
unconditional offer to return to work. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369-70
(1968). They also remain eligible to vote as employees in the event of an election to end union
representation. See Bio-Science Lab. v. NLRB, 542 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1976). This is
little solace to the employees contemplating risking their jobs by striking.
133 H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
134 See Cox, supra note 67, at 587-88.
135 See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1337-39 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the Executive Order was contrary to the NLRA as interpreted in Mackay); see also
supra note 67 and accompanying text.

112

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19:83

The EFCA is silent on these questions. Again, the EFCA is not the end,
but the beginning of the discussion.
C.

Remedies for Unfair Labor Practices
1.

The Employee Free Choice Act

The Employee Free Choice Act would modify the remedies for unfair labor practices in three respects. First, the EFCA strengthens provisions for expedited injunctive relief for illegal employer discrimination
or restraint, interference, or coercion during union organizing campaigns
or during first contract negotiations by expanding Section 10(1) of the
NLRA to include those unfair labor practices.' 36 Section 10(1) requires
priority investigation of certain unfair labor practice charges and that
"[i]f... reasonable cause [exists] to believe that such charge is true" the
Regional Director "shall" seek in federal district court "appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board ....,,137 Without the EFCA amendments, Section 10(1) only covers unfair labor
practices committed by unions, such as unlawful secondary boycotts and
recognitional picketing. 138 Thus, the EFCA merely opens to employees
an avenue of temporary relief that has been available to employers since
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. On a practical level, this
change would create a mechanism for employees fired or discriminated
against because of their support of a union to be reinstated during the
lengthy NLRB unfair labor practice process. 139 One problem that could
arise is scarce financial resources for a greatly increased number of cases
in which the Regional Director would seek injunctive relief in federal
court. Here, again, increased authority for state officers to seek these
injunctions would be entirely consistent with the policies of the Act.
A second remedy change in the EFCA provides for triple back pay
awards for willful illegal anti-union discrimination, interference, or coer140
cion during an organizing campaign or first contract negotiations.
While this provision strengthens remedies for some unfair labor practices
by employers, it does not cover anti-union actions in other situations, and
falls far short of the compensatory and punitive damages available for
almost all other forms of discrimination. NLRB case law requires that
back pay be reduced by interim earnings and that a discharged employee
136 See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. § (4)(a) (lst Sess.
2009).
137 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (2006).
138 See id. §§ 158(b)(4), (7).
139 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) has long authorized requests for injunctive relief for unfair labor
practices not covered by Section 10(1) of the NLRA. These provisions are discretionary, not
mandatory as in Section 10(1), and require action by the Board in Washington, D.C., not action
by the Regional Director charged with investigating a charge. See id. § 1600).
140 See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, § 4(b)(1).
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make reasonable efforts to mitigate back pay losses by seeking other
work.14 1 Thus, even triple back pay awards may not be sufficient to
change the calculus of costs and benefits for illegal action. Why should
anti-union discrimination be considered less worthy of emotional distress
and punitive damages than other forms of discrimination? Again, the
Employee Free Choice Act only begins a discussion.
Finally, the EFCA would create a civil penalty, capped at $20,000,
for employer discrimination, restraint, or coercion during a union organizing campaign and before completion of first contract negotiations. 142 Such a penalty, even if levied to the maximum, is unlikely to
provide significant deterrence, and would not compensate for emotional
distress or include the punitive damages available in other types of discrimination cases. Indeed, in many cases, a $20,000 fine, assuming the
maximum fine was levied, would be less than an employer's attorney's
fees for defending the unfair labor practice charge. As will be seen below, state tort and other state remedies could easily be allowed to supplement EFCA remedies, just as these state remedies may supplement Title
VII remedies for other forms of discrimination. 143
IV.

THE STATES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN BASTIONS OF INNOVATION
UNDER THE BASELINE RULE IN THE AMERICAN LAW
OF THE WORKPLACE

Like a little country cottage gradually overtaken by a sprawling metropolis, federal labor law, first enacted in 1935, now exists in the larger
world of employment law regulation. This includes, for example, state
wage and hour laws, laws prohibiting various forms of discrimination,
workplace leave laws, occupational health and safety laws, and state torts
such as wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Indeed, as
many writers have pointed out, the "individual rights revolution" has replaced the older, New Deal-era, collective bargaining system for most

141 See, e.g., NLRB v. Midw. Personnel Servs., 508 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2007); see also

Cox, supra note 67, at 264-66.
142 See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111 th Cong. § 4(b)(2) (1st Sess.
2009).
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2006); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292,
1300 (Or. 1984) (providing tort remedy for wrongful discharge where plaintiff was discharged
for resisting sexual harassment); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551-53 (N.H.
1974) (allowing for recovery for breach of contract where plaintiff was discharged for resisting
sexual harassment).
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American employees." 44 Shared federal, state, and local governmental
1 45
responsibility constitutes the pattern in many other contexts as well.
The broad federal labor law preemption doctrines originating in an
earlier time no longer fit into this larger context. This raises an important
question: Why is a uniform and exclusively federal labor management
relations law necessary for private sector employers and employees when
most other areas of workplace regulation incorporate state and local regulation within federal minimum standards?
Further, as history teaches, the states have time and again utilized
their shared authority under the federalism model of employment regulation to pioneer new and needed protections, and this history is instructive
14 6
in considering the EFCA debate.
A.

Minimum Wage, Overtime Pay, and Child Labor Regulation

State minimum wage laws preceded federal legislation by a quarter
century. 147 Since the adoption of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) in 1938,148 state minimum wage laws, laws regulating maximum
hours of work and overtime pay, and child labor regulation have coexisted with their federal counterparts. Indeed, in the FLSA, Congress provided expressly, as this Article argues should be the case with federal
149
labor law, for non-preemption of more protective state enactments.
While minimum wage laws continue to generate debate, 150 the point
here is not that the states always make the "correct" policy decision, but
rather that they make the policy decisions.
While the federal minimum wage rests at $7.25,151 the state minimum wage is $8.00 in California, 152 $7.75 in Illinois,15 3 $8.55 in Wash144 See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 7-15 (1990); Clyde W.

Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REv. 7,
10-12 (1988) (describing the move from collective bargaining toward prescribing minimum
rights and terms of employment by public laws).
145 See Drummonds, supra note 23, at 479-88.
146 For a more exhausting coverage of this history, see id. at 489-509.
147 See David Neumark & William Waschler, Minimum Wage Wages and Low-Wage
Workers: How Well Does Reality Match the Rhetoric?, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1296, 1298 (2008)
(noting that fifteen states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico had adopted minimum
wage legislation by 1923-fifteen years before the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act was
enacted).
148 Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
149 See 29 U.S.C. § 218.
150 See, e.g., Neumark & Waschler, supra note 147.
151 See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (a)(1)(C).
152 See CAL. LAB. CODE, § 1182.12 (West Supp. 2009).
153 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. AN. 105/4 (West 2008).
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ington, 54 and $8.40 in Oregon. 55 Millions of workers benefit directly
from this shared federal and state authority, and several million more
benefit indirectly because of the "spillover" effect minimum wage laws
exert on "near minimum" compensation. 56 This illustrates an important
point about federalism in workplace law: some states can adopt standards
that fit local conditions long before a federal consensus evolves, while
others accept the federal minimum standard. Further advantages to this
federalism model include experimentation at the state level and more direct involvement of citizens in crafting the state laws governing their
workplace relationships. 57 This same pattern holds with hours of work
regulation. While, with many exceptions, the FLSA requires premium
overtime pay for work over forty hours per week,1 58 state laws can provide for overtime pay after an eight-hour work day, 1 5 9 or cap work hours
60
altogether in certain occupations. 1
It is important to take these differences into account because compliance with varying state and local minimum wage and maximum hour
laws and child labor regulations, and the "push" effects this has on other
employees, involve major costs for employers. Human resources personnel and the lawyers responsible for legal compliance in these areas deal
daily with differential standards in the states, whether the affected business entity is local, national, or global in scope.
B.

OccupationalHealth and Safety-Preventing and Compensating
Workplace Injury and Workplace-Related Disease

The Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)16 1 provides another model for shared federal and state authority over the workplace. "Workplace injuries and occupational disease involve tremendous
costs for employees and employers alike. For that reason, the equitable
154 See WASH. REV. CODE Arm. § 49.46.020(4)(b) (West 2008) (authorizing annual upward adjustment for inflation); see also Department of Labor, Minimum Wage Laws in the
States, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm.
155 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.025(2)(a), (b) (2007) (authorizing annual upward adjustment for inflation); Department of Labor, supra note 154.
156 See Fact Sheet For 2009 Minimum Wage Increase in MINIMUM WAGE ISSUE GUIDE,
July 20, 2009, www.epi.org/publications/entry/mwig-fact_sheet.
157 See Drummonds, supra note 23, at 513-25. Of course, minimum wages carry redistribution effects and may decrease the number of jobs available to low-end workers. See Neumark & Waschler, supra note 147 at 1304.
158

See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006).
§ 511 (West 2008); United States Department of Labor,

159 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE.

supra note 154.
160 See, e.g., OR.

REV. STAT.

occupations).
161

29 U.S.C. § 651-78.

ANN. § 652.010 (2007) (maximum 10 hour day in certain
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allocation of these costs, and their reduction by preventive . . . mea-

sures " continue to be major issues in the law of the workplace.'

62

1. Compensation for Injury
Compensation for workplace injury remains a state law issue under
the "workers' compensation" statutes for most employers and employees. These "no fault" statutes were pioneered in the states during the
Progressive Era, 163 and continue to be the primary remedy for workplace
injury today. In fact, these state statutes provided the model for the subsequent enactment of federal no-fault compensation statutes in areas of
unique federal concern, such as federal employees, 164 and longshore and
harbor workers. 65 Under exceptions to the "exclusive remedy" provisions of these statutes, state tort law also sometimes provides compensatory remedies against employers and third parties. 166 State tort law
remedies also provided the model for other categories of unique federal
concern, such as the federal remedies for railroad workers 167 and
sailors. 168 Some states innovated with these workers' compensation systems, expanding them to include occupational diseases, most famously
asbestos-related diseases.' 69 Congress expressly preserved these state
170
compensation claims in OSHA.
2. Workplace Injury and Disease Prevention
Beyond these obvious examples, the prevention of (as distinct from
compensation for) workplace injury and disease provides a different
model of shared state and federal authority. The federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulates workplace safety primarily
through thousands of detailed federal "standards." 17 1 The Occupational
162 Drummonds, supra note 23, at 493.

163 See generally Arthur Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation,
37 CORNELL L. Q. 206 (1952).
164 See 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (2006).
165 See Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (2006).
166 See, e.g., Teal v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1984) (contractor's employee's personal injury suit for manufacturers' negligence and OSHA violations
allowed); Borel v. Fibreboard, 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (worker allowed to bring third
party claim against manufacturer of asbestos used at worksites).
167 See Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006) (railroad
workers may sue their employers for negligence).
168 See Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2006) (extending rights to sue employer for personal
injury to seamen).
169 See, e.g., Elinor P. Schroeder & Sidney A. Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regulation and Information, 72 GEO. L.J. 1231, 1246 (1984) ("Asbestos insulation workers [in one study] filed workers' compensation claims for only thirtythree percent of their asbestos-related disabilities .... ").
170 See Occupational Safety and Health Act § 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (2006).
171 See 29 U.S.C. § 655.
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Safety and Health Administration and the Department of Labor enforce
these standards through a system of citations, abatement orders, and fines
1 72
and penalties.
Yet Congress created a unique and innovative system of shared federal and state authority in the prevention area. Under OSHA, federal law
preempts more stringent state law only to the extent the practice or condition in question is covered by a specific standard; there is no concept of
"field" preemption under OSHA. 173 Even this decree of preemption was
controversial, with the Supreme Court splitting 5-4 on this interpretation
174
of the law.
The most unique part of the congressional preemption scheme under
OSHA, however, lies in Section 18(b).1 75 These provisions provide for a
kind of "reverse preemption" of federal standards and enforcement
schemes by more protective state occupational health and safety plans
approved by the U.S. Secretary of Labor. About one-half of the states
176
operate under Section 18(b) workplace plans.
C.

Status Discrimination

Banning status discrimination immediately comes to mind in any
discussion of the need for uniform federal standards. Yet here again,
state law plays a unique role in crucial respects. Again, Congress has
spoken on the issues of federalism and preemption.
First, despite persistent perceptions to the contrary, state law led
federal governmental action in the employment discrimination area, and
continues to do so. Long before the passage of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act in 1964,177 many states had banned racial discrimination in
employment. 178 In fact, Congress carefully preserved these state systems
by requiring that Title VII plaintiffs exhaust state administrative remedies as a condition of bringing a case in the federal district courts, and
179
allowing more time for filing a charge in states with such agencies.
Similarly, "[a]bout half the states and the District of Columbia, and numerous cities have enacted laws prohibiting discrimination in private em172 See id.. §§ 657-659.
173 See id. § 667(a); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992).
174 See Gade, 505 U.S. at 95 (Souter, Blackmun, Stevens, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
175 See Occupational Safety and Health Act § 18(b); 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2006).
176
BOR,

See OSHA, Factsheet: State Job Safety and Health Programs, DEPARTMENT

OF LA-

Apr. 2004, http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/dataGeneralFacts/factsheet-statejob.pdf.

177

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).

See generally Michael A. Bamberger & Nathan Lewin, Note, The Right To Equal
Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74 HARv. L. REV.
178

526 (1961) (describing state enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes by the establishment of
commissions authorized to combat discrimination by various measures).
179 See Title VII, §§ 706 (c)-(e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c)-(e) (2006).
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ployment on the basis of sexual orientation."' 180 A bill pending in
Congress may extend Title VII to sexual orientation,' 8 1 but its passage
would follow many state and local enactments. Additionally, while the
Supreme Court did not interpret Title VII to reach sexual harassment
until 1986,182 many forms of sexual harassment were already actionable
under state tort theories such as assault, battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and wrongful discharge. 1 83 As these examples
demonstrate, a national consensus on any new employment or labor law
policy is far more likely after it has first been accepted in a critical number of states.
Second, state remedies supplement and often exceed federal remedies in the discrimination area. Before the 1991 Civil Rights Act created
compensatory and punitive damages remedies for intentional Title VII
violations, 184 state anti-discrimination statutes and tort remedies provided such remedies for discrimination. 85 Even after the 1991 Act, state
discrimination law remedies, unlike Title VII, often allow uncapped or
higher caps for damages,186 as do state tort theories. 187 Labor law stands
in sharp contrast, as the preemption doctrine prevents the states from
supplementing federal remedies for anti-union discrimination.
D. Family and Other Leave Issues
The same pattern is observed in other areas of workplace regulation,
such as family, parental, and medical leave laws. Today, state statutes
often cover a broader range of employers and provide for leave in cir-

180 Rothstein, supra note 82, at 386 n.5.
181 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009 (ENDA), H.R. 2981, 111 th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009).
182 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
183 Drummonds, supra note 27, at 496-97.
184 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
185 See, e.g., Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Or. 1984) (wrongful
discharge); Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs. Inc., 435 So.2d 705 (Ala. 1983) (right to privacy); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1974) (breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
186 Compare 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8B-104(B) (West 2009), N.Y. ExEc.
LAW § 297(4)(c)(iii) (McKinney 2006), and OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.885 (2007), with 42
U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (2006) (capping Title VII damages at $50,000 to $300,000 depending on
the size of the employer as measured by the number of employees). But see CAL. GOV'T
CODE §12970(a)(3) (West 2005) (damages capped at $150,000); TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 21.2585(d) (Vernon 2007) (capping damages at $50,000 to $300,000 depending on
size of employer as measured by the number of employees).
187 See, e.g., Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Tate v. Browning Ferris Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1230 (Okla. 1992).
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cumstances not permitted under federal law. 188 Further, paid leave laws
are now being pioneered in the states. 189
E.

Summary of Shared Federaland State Law in the Law of the
Workplace

The point is not that every initiative at the state or local level is wise
or needed, but that state level initiatives and experimentation have been
the norm in the American law of the workplace. This allows federal
action to be informed both by what works and what does not. It allows
citizens in the states to seek to fulfill their aspirations without being
bound by a national common denominator. It allows experimentation,
flexibility, and a greater voice in the formulation of such policies.
V.

THE MAZE OF JUDICIALLY CREATED LABOR LAW
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 190

As set forth in the Introduction to this Article, in theory, preemption
rests upon congressional intent. Often, however, as with the federal labor law preemption doctrine, judges, not senators and congressmen, create the doctrines that displace state authority. 19 1
As Supreme Court cases often explain, three general types of federal preemption exist: (1) express preemption by Congress, (2) pervasive
federal governmental regulation, which occupies an entire "field," and
(3) implied "conflict" preemption. 92 There are two types of conflict
188 For example, the Family Medical Leave Act covers only employers with at least fifty
employees, while in Oregon, the state statute covers employers with as few as twenty-five
employees. See Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2006); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 659A.150-186 (2007); see also California Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945.2
(West 2005) (providing paid leave in some situations).
189 See, e.g., CAL. UN. INS. CODE § 3301 (West Supp. 2009); NJ STAT. ANN. § 43:21-27
(West Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.78.220 (West 2008).
190 Three distinct preemption doctrines created by the Supreme Court rest upon the Labor
Management Relations Act, which subsumed the National Labor Relations Act. These are the
"Garnon" doctrine, the "Machinists" doctrine, and the "Section 301" preemption doctrine.
See Drummonds, supra note 23, at 564 (citing statutes and cases). This Article addresses only
the first two of these presumptions. The author has elsewhere made suggestions for changes in
Section 301's unnecessarily broad displacement of state law, because the displacement has had
the ironic effect of placing limits on the individual state law rights of union members in
situations where non-union members would enjoy those same individual rights. See id. at
574-82.
191 See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80 (1990). This framework,
however, sheds little light on the cases. See Drummonds, supra note 23, at 529 & nn.343-44
(noting that "field" preemption can be either express or implied (citing English, 496 U.S. at
79-80 ("[F]ield preemption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption."))); see
also e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 109, 114 (1992) (four
justice plurality applied implied conflict preemption analysis, with Justice Kennedy treating
the case as involving express preemption, and the four dissenters characterizing the plurality
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preemption: (1) conflicts arising from the impossibility of complying
with state and federal law simultaneously (which is generally not controversial), and (2) conflicts from state law that "stands as an obstacle" to
the full attainment of congressional objectives, as divined by the

94
courts. 193 Labor law preemption doctrine fits into this latter category.1

In theory, implied "obstacle" preemption falls under the "clear statement" doctrine, requiring a "clear and manifest" or "clear and unambiguous" indication of congressional intent to preempt state law. 195 As will

be seen, much federal labor law preemption doctrine ignores this general
principle of the broader law of preemption.
Instead, this labor law preemption doctrine sprang from the New
Dealers' faith in a federal administrative agency's ability to enunciate
and promulgate a uniform and consistent national labor relations policy. 196 Originating a half-century ago, the federal labor law preemption

doctrine preceded the larger framework of shared federal and state responsibility in employment law that has grown up around it (as shown in
Part IV above). Then-Justice Rehnquist's reminder, noted at the outset
of this Article, colorfully emphasized that this mighty doctrinal oak grew
from the acorns of a few early decisions, without congressional guidance. 197 As the authors of a leading casebook point out, "No legal issue
in the field of collective bargaining has been presented to the Supreme
Court more frequently ...

than that of the preemption of state law, and

approach as involving both "purpose-conflict" doctrine and "federal occupation of a field
193 See Gade, 505 U.S. at 983 (1992); Ha. Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963). The second type of conflicts preemption, "obstacle preemption," gives
the courts almost unbridled discretion. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1211-18
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 120 (1994).
194 "The national Labor Management Relations Act... leaves much to the states, though
Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible." Garner v. Teamsters Local, 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953); see also 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assoc. Ltd. v.
Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he issue facing us is one of implied
preemption."). The NLRA, however, contains two provisions that explicitly preserve state
authority. National Labor Relations Act § 14(c), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2006), allows the states
to assert jurisdiction when it is declined by the NLRA. National Labor Relations Act § 14(b),
29 U.S.C. § 164(b), allows the states to "reverse preempt" the NLRA's express authorization
for the union shop. Twenty-one states, mostly in the South and Midwest, presently carry
"right to work" laws on their books and these states have relatively low rates of unionization.
See generally Cox, supra note 67, at 1193-97. The latter provision in particularly concedes a
foundational issue of labor policy to the states.
195 Drummonds, supra note 23, at 530-31 (quoting Cippllone v. Leggett Group Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 516 (1992)); see also Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 146-52; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1947); Estlund, Ossification, supra note 32, at 1599-1600.
196 See infra notes 212, 229-232 and accompanying text.
197 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 622 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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perhaps no other issue has been left in quite as much confusion."' 198
Thus, attention must be paid to the major cases that have developed the
federal labor law preemption doctrine.
A.

"Garmon" Preemption of State Law Concerning Conduct That Is
Either "Arguably Protected" or "Arguably Prohibited" by the
NLRA.
1. The Garmon Decision and Its Underlying Rationales

The beginning of the federal labor law preemption doctrine involved a modest dispute in California in 1953. Two California unions
demanded a union shop agreement from a lumberyard.1 99 The employer
responded that its employees did not desire unionization and that neither
union was the lawfully designated representative of the employees, and
the unions commenced picketing. 200 A California trial court enjoined the
picketing and awarded the lumberyard $1,000 in damages after concluding that the union's purpose was to force a union shop agreement despite
the lack of representation rights in either of the unions; the injunction
was to last until one of the unions became the majority representative of
the employees. 20 1 The California Supreme Court sustained the judgment
on the ground that the NLRB had declined jurisdiction over the dispute. 20 2 In "Garmon I ' '203 the United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, holding that "the refusal of the National Labor Relations
Board to assert jurisdiction did not leave the states power over activities
they would otherwise be preempted from regulating. ' '20 4 On remand, the
California Supreme Court sustained a $1,000 damages award against the
unions, and again the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 20 5 While the result
was unanimous, four Justices, led by Justice Harlan, concurred on markedly different grounds than those articulated by Justice Frankfurter for
198 Cox, supra note 67, at 1004. This is the view of many scholars. Justice Brennan, a
champion of broad preemption, once forthrightly acknowledged, "Pre-emption cases in the
labor law area are difficult because we must decide the questions presented without any clear
guidance from Congress ....
[Our] standards are by necessity general ones which may not
provide as much assistance as we would like in particular cases." Belknap v. Hale, 436 U.S.
491, 523 (1983) (Brennan, J. dissenting); see also Gregory, supra note 29, at 508 (Labor law
preemption doctrine is "one of the most intricate structures in legal theory."); Drummonds,
supra note 23, at 560-61, and sources cited therein.
199 See San Diego Bldg. Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 237 (1959) [hereinafter Garmon I1].
200 See id. The unions claimed the picketing was solely to educate the employees and

persuade them to become members of the union. Id. at 237.
201 See id. at 237-38.
202 Id. at 238.
203

See San Diego Bldg Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957) [hereinafter Gar-

mon I].
204
205

Garmon II, 359 U.S. at 237 (explaining holding in Garmon 1).
See Garmon II, 359 U.S. 236, 239-49 (1959).
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the majority. 20 6 It is not the result of Justice Frankfurter's decision but
its reasoning, that affects federal labor law preemption a half-century
later.
Justice Frankfurter's 1959 opinion for the majority in "Garmon If'
became the seminal case for the broad labor law preemption doctrine that
shackles the states in the labor relation policy arena today-the Garmon
doctrine. After pointing out that the "Court was called upon to apply a
new and complicated legislative scheme [the amended NLRA], the aims
and social policy of which were drawn with broad strokes while the de20 7
tails had to be filled in, to no small extent, by the judicial process,"
Justice Frankfurter stated that "'the statutory implications concerning
what has been taken from the States and what has been left to them are of
a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of
litigating elucidation.' ",208 Thus, right from the start, the Gannon doctrine resulted not from any policy decision by Congress, but from a split
5-4 decision of the Supreme Court.2 0 9 On this shaky foundation rests
the federal preemption doctrine referred to in 1982 by then-Justice Rehnquist as an inappropriately judicially created "mighty oak" of a doctrine, 2 10 grown even larger by another quarter century of cases, and still
growing, as illustrated by the 2008 Chamber of Commerce2 l ' decision,
When Justice Frankfurter wrote the Garmon majority's decision in
1959, his focus was on state interference with NLRA rights, then only a
quarter-century old, and his long-seated distrust of judicial labor relations
policy making.2 1 2 The unions' picketing of the lumberyard, depending
on its purposes, may have been protected by Section 7 of the NLRA,
which guaranteed the right to engage in "concerted activity ... for mutual aid or protection." 213 Section 7 protects picketing for the purpose of

peacefully persuading employees that they should join the union. 2 14 On
206 See id. at 249-54 (Harlan, J., concurring).
207 Id. at

240.

208 Id. at 241 (quoting International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619

(1958)).
209 Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and Whittaker, concurred on much
narrower grounds, that "the unions' activities for which the state has awarded damages may
fairly be considered protected under the Taft-Hartley Act and that therefore state action is
precluded until the National Labor Relations Board has made a contrary determination .
Id. at 249 (Harlan, J., concurring).
210 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 622 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
211 Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
212 See Garmon 11, 359 U.S. 236, 239-49 (1959); FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUN TION 200-03, 206 (1930).

213 National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). Since the adoption of the
NLRA in 1935, Section 7 has provided employees a federally guaranteed right to organize,
bargain collectively, and to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection. See id.
214 See id.
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the other hand, the unions' picketing might have been, as the state court
found, a violation of the NLRA if the purpose was to coerce the employees or put economic pressure on the lumberyard to sign a union shop
contract when a majority of the employees did not want union representation. 2 15 Yet Justice Frankfurter and other New Dealers distrusted the
state courts, and placed great faith in the NLRB, the federal agency entrusted by Congress with the general administration of the Act. 216 This
was true even where the federal agency had declined to hear the dispute,
and where the state court had already made findings of fact and determined that the unions' picketing had the proscribed purpose, and thereby
violated the employees' Section 7 rights to refrain from union representation, and hence, violated Section 8 of the Act.
Holding that Congress impliedly preempted the California courts,
the Garmon majority announced the test that remains the law 50 years
later: "When an activity is arguably subject to [Section] 7 or [Section] 8
of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted. '2 17 The
Garmon "arguably protected, arguably prohibited" test rests upon two
policy concerns. 2 8 First, as recently explained by the Seventh Circuit,
Garmon "seeks to prevent conflicts between state and local regulation
and [federal regulation] embodied in [Sections] 7 and 8 of the
NLRA. ''2 19 Second, "Garmon preemption further seeks to protect the
NLRB's primary jurisdiction in cases involving Sections 7 or 8 of the
NLRA. ' '220 Generations of labor lawyers, professors, and students have
22 1
worshipped at this doctrinal shrine.
As shown below, a maze of exceptions and alternative analytical
constructs have sprung up in the many Supreme Court cases since Gar215 See Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 320 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1958). Since the
1947 Taft-Hartley Act, Section 7 has also provided employees with federally guaranteed right
to refrain from organizing, collective bargaining, and engaging in concerted activities. See
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). Moreover, Taft-Hartley also makes
illegal any attempt to interfere with or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 right
to refrain an unfair labor practice under National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b).
216 See Dmmmonds, supra note 23, at 562 nn.517-19 and sources cited therein.
217 Garmon II, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
218 See Cox, supra note 67, at 1004-05.
219 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assoc., Ltd. v. Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119, 1125 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted).
220 Id. (citations omitted).
221 The leading labor law casebook, Archibald Cox's Labor Law Cases and Materials,
supra note 69 at 1001-86, devotes an entire chapter of 85 pages to these doctrines. A second
leading casebook expends 32 pages discussing labor law preemption. See THEODORE ST. ANTOINE ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS § 8 (11 th ed. 2005).
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mon. But before turning to the intervening case law complexity, we shall
more closely examine the underpinnings of Garmon itself.
a.

The "Conflict in Substantive Rights" Rationale of
Garmon

Garmon's first rationale, to prevent a substantive conflict between
federal and state law, remains a valid purpose for any preemption analysis. Suppose the picketing of the lumberyard in Garmon was in fact protected picketing under Section 7. Obviously, under the Supremacy
Clause, California state courts cannot award damages for conduct that
Congress protects. This premise follows from a straightforward conflicts
analysis. Why didn't the Frankfurter majority simply decide that question? Indeed, this provided the basis for Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion, joined by three other Justices. 222 The answer, of course, is the
majority's second rationale-the primary agency jurisdiction rationalewhich will be returned to in the following part.
Suppose, on the other hand, the union's picketing in Garmon was in
fact, as found by the California courts, for the purpose of coercing the
employees and lumber yard to agree to a union shop absent majority
support for the union-a clear violation of Section 8(b), then and now.
How could a state remedy for violation of the NLRA interfere with federal rights? Here again, why didn't the Court simply decide whether the
unions' picketing conduct promoted the forbidden purpose?
Two rationales explain Garmon's formulation of the "arguably prohibited" prong. First, the only substantive difference between state and
federal law in the "prohibited" situation would relate not to the conduct,
but to the remedy for illegal conduct. The Garmon majority was concerned about state court damages awards for union conduct which, even
if illegal under the NLRA, could not be the subject of damages awards
under the scheme devised by Congress for the remedy of unfair labor
practices under the Act. 223 Thus, to the majority, the California court's

award of damages was inconsistent with the NLRA remedy, which
would have been merely a cease and desist order and similar equitable
relief.2 2 4 In this view, Congress created a carefully balanced remedial

scheme and intended to prevent states from supplementing these federal
remedies for NLRA prohibited conduct.
222 Gannon 11, 359 U.S. at 249 (Harlan, J., concurring).
223 See Garmon H, 359 U.S. 236, 238, 244 (1959).
224 Cf National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2006). Presently, the only
conduct for which damages can be awarded under the NLRA is for a union's violation of the
secondary boycott, hot cargo, and recognitional picketing prohibitions of the Act. See National Labor Relations Act§§ 8 (b)(4), (7), 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158; Labor Management Relations Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187.
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It remains doubtful, to say the least, that the 1935 or 1947 Congress
intended any such displacement of state law. While clearly Congress
must have meant to supplant state law condemnation of federally protected conduct, it is not a given that Congress meant to ban state remedies for conduct prohibited by federal law for several reasons. First, in
this area of implied conflicts preemption, a presumption against preemption applies, and the Garmon majority says nothing about this presumption. Second, the four concurring Justices in Garmon refused to find that
state remedies were preempted by the existence of a federal remedy for
federally prohibited conduct; the judges of that time were almost evenly
divided on this proposition, though it is now commonly accepted with
little discussion. 22 5 Third, as Justice Harlan explained, for the twelve
years between the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act and Garmon II, the Court followed a more traditional and far narrower preemption analysis; several
cases seemed to uphold state remedies for NLRA-prohibited conduct that
differed from the federal remedies and there was no intervening congres2 26
sional action.
As will be seen below, the unnecessarily broad doctrine created by
Justice Frankfurter, not Congress, today prevents the states from extending the compensatory-including emotional distress-and punitive
damages remedies that now exist for other forms of discrimination to
anti-union, discriminatory activity. Moreover, federal preemption is triggered even when the conduct only "arguably" stands prohibited by the
federal law. That reach of the doctrine, however, rests not on the substantive conflict, but rather upon the primary agency jurisdiction
rationale.
b.

The Primary Agency Jurisdiction Rationale of the
Garmon Majority

Though Justice Frankfurter's Garmon decision preempted a state
court's jurisdiction, primary agency jurisdiction applies to federal courts
as well.22 7 A generation before the Garmon decision, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 largely banned federal judges from issuing labor
injunctions. 22s The primary intellectual foundation for this anti-labor injunction enactment was a book 229 by then-Professor Frankfurter that
chronicled the use of judicial injunctions in labor disputes, often to the
detriment of workers and unions. 230 A few years later, the New Dealers
225

Garmon 11, 359 U.S. at 249 (Harlan, J., concurring).

226 See id. at 250-54, and cases cited therein.
227 See id. at 245.
228

See Norris LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), codified as

amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (2006).
229 FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 212.
230 See Cox, supra note 67, at 49-54.
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turned to a host of federal administrative agencies to fill the perceived
need for regulation of the Depression-era economy. To the New Dealers,
agencies, rather than courts, promised an expertise-based and uniform set
of federal policies to implement the new thinking of that time. 231 Justice
Frankfurter's Garmon opinion reflects this background. In his vision, the
NLRB would fashion and enforce a uniform national labor policy to
232
which the courts would largely defer.
Fifty years later, the hopes of the New Dealers lie in ruins. The
courts, including the Supreme Court, often ignore the "expertise" based
judgments of the NLRB. 2 33 The NLRB has become politicized and its

234
decisions swing to and fro with the changing political administrations.
Indeed, because of political gridlock concerning appointments, the five
member Board sometimes lacks three members to constitute a majority
to hear cases, as occurred for the entirety of 2008 and, as of this writing,

most of 2009.235 The substantive law fashioned by the Board so disfa231 See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 784 (Eric Foner & John A.
Garraty, eds., 1991) (listing administrative agencies created by New Deal legislation
1933-1936, and discussing the National Labor Relations Act).
232 Cf. Garmon I1, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959) ("Congress has entrusted administration of
the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own
procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience .... ").
233 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (reversing NLRB
on question of supervisory exclusion); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (NLRB
order granting union organizers access to shopping center reversed); First Nat'l. Maint. Corp.
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (reversing NLRB decision that company had duty to bargain
before implementing partial closure decision); Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301
(1979) (NLRB order that company disclose information relevant to union's grievances under
collective bargaining contract partially reversed); HK Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970)
(NLRB remedy for bad faith bargaining ordering employer to sign contract with union dues
check off provision reversed); Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (NLRB
holding that employer lockout was unfair labor practice reversed); NLRB v. Ins. Agents Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (NLRB ruling that concerted slowdown during bargaining process
constituted failure to bargain in good faith reversed); NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am.,
357 U.S. 357 (1958) (affirming Court of Appeals reversal of NLRB finding that employer
enforcement of non-solicitation rule was discriminatory); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (NLRB's order re-instating sit-down strikers protesting employer's
unfair labor practices reversed).
234 See Bush Labor Board Decisions: Pendulum Shift or Permanent Changes?, 56 LAB.
L. J. 212 (2005) (Interview with Professors William R. Corbett, Ellen Dannin, & Michael C.
Harper); David L. Gregory, The NLRB and the Politics of Labor Law, 27 B.C. L. Rev. 39, 40
(1985); David P. Twomey, Policymaking Under the Bush H1 National Labor Relations Board:
Where Do We Go From Here?, 59 LAB. L. J 141 (2008).
235 Throughout 2008 and at least most of 2009, the Board had only two members. The
Board was only able to function at all because the Justice Department wrote an opinion saying
that the full five member Board, while it still had five members, could delegate its authority to
a three member panel, and that these three could in turn delegate their power to two members
when one of those three subsequently left the Board. Thus the remaining two members decided only the cases upon which they could agree. This double delegation has been challenged
in eight courts of appeal. The cases decided did not involve substantial legal issues, and the
two remaining members could not "agree on 20 to 25 percent of the new cases, and on a
'significant number' of major cases pending [from] when the Board still had five members."
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vors union representation that major unions openly pursue a policy of
avoiding Board processes altogether. 23 6 Only a small percentage of the
unfair labor practice charges filed with the Board result in hearings in
which the interested parties have resort to the subpoena power and crossexamination of witnesses under oath. 237 Many academics have concluded that Board processes and remedies fail to protect employees in the
right to organize and engage in activities supportive of unions. 238 Board
processes, when charges do lead to hearings, take years to conclude and
result in remedies that do little to vindicate those whose rights have been
violated. Absent a Supreme Court decision, the Board itself refuses to
consider itself bound to follow legal interpretations of the courts of appeal in any case other than the case under review. The circuits have split
in their interpretations of federal labor law. In short, the "uniform labor
law" is often a chimera of changing Board decisions, conflicting courts
of appeal decisions, and inconsistent Supreme Court willingness to defer
to Board expertise under administrative review doctrines.
Even if the hopes of the New Dealers were justified in their own
time, events since Garmon carry lessons that can no longer be ignored.
Just as federal agencies are not relied upon exclusively to protect the
environment or ensure reasonably safe access to prescription drugs with
proper research and disclosure of risks, 239 so too must labor relations

break out of the exclusive federal agency regulation model.
Nonetheless, Justice Frankfurter's primary agency jurisdiction rationale should be examined on its own terms. First, if state law suffers
displacement whenever conduct is "arguably" protected or prohibited by
the NLRA, then that displacement will obviously occur in some cases
where the conduct was neither protected nor prohibited. It is extraordinary to attribute to Congress an intent to displace state law in these situations. Second, the doctrine, as applied, does not merely defer to the
NLRB in the sense of exhaustion of remedies. Rather, under Garmon,
the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. 240 Yet, literal exhaustion would
Victoria L. Bor, National Labor Relations Board Members Reflect on Their Legacy, 37 LAB.
& EMPLOY. L. 4 (2008). On November 2, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the legality of these two-member rulings in unfair labor practice and representation
cases. See New Process Steel v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009) cert. granted 130 S. Ct.
488 (2009).
236 See Estlund, Ossification, supra note 32.
237 See generallyCox, supra note 67, at 98-101. "In the 2004 fiscal year... of the 29,954
unfair labor practice charges that were 'closed,' 29% were withdrawn before the complaint
issued, 30.8% were dismissed before a complaint, and 35.8% were settled or adjusted-only
2.3% proceeded contested cases to be closed by a final Board order." Id. at 99.
238 See supra notes 37 and 59 and sources cited therein.
239 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
240 See William C. Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1037, 1039 n.8 (1973).
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suffice to access the presumed expertise of the Board, which is the justification for this branch of Garmon's underpinnings.
Finally, Garmon's assumption that judges cannot be entrusted to
faithfully follow federal labor law as announced by the NLRB and the
Supreme Court finds no support in other aspects of modem labor law.
For example, state and federal courts share concurrent jurisdiction over
Section 301 suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements; 24' in those
cases, state courts are charged with applying the federal law of collective
labor contracts. 242 Furthermore, state courts entertain cases involving
243
unions' breaches of the federal labor law duty of fair representation.
Paradoxically, considering Garmon's distrust of courts as exemplified in
the primary agency jurisdiction rationale, state courts faced with preemp244
tion claims must also apply federal labor law preemption doctrine,
"one of the most intricate structures in legal theory. ' 245
2.

Gannon's Tangled Web of Exceptions and Departures

In the fifty years since Garmon, numerous "exceptions, limitations,
refinements, and qualifications" 246 have appeared. Two vague exceptions appeared in Garmon itself. First, state tort and criminal law remedies for violence, mass picketing, or property destruction withstand
Garmon preemption for matters "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility. '24 7 The second is for matters of "merely peripheral concem" to the federal labor law. 24 8 Other exceptions soon appeared: some
state laws of "general applicability" escaped preemption, as did others
where "properly understood, federal regulatory policy can be narrowly
construed and the state policy readily accommodated.

'249

Thus, in Su-

preme Court Garmon jurisprudence alone, state tort claims for malicious
defamation in labor disputes, fraud and misrepresentation, trespass, and
241 See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506-09 (1962). Further, even
where conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, it can
also be a breach of a collective bargaining agreement actionable before federal and state courts
under LMRA Section 301. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962).
242 See Charles Dowd Box Co., 368 U.S. at 507-10.
243 See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 173, 188 (1967).
244 See, e.g., Willard v. Khotol Services Corp., 171 P.3d 108, 120 (Alaska 2007); Barbieri
v. United Tech. Corp., 771 A.2d 915, 923 (Conn. 2001); Foreman v. As Mid-Am. Inc., 586
N.W. 2d 290, 297-98 (Neb. 1998); Ohio State Bldg & Constr. Trades Council v. Cuyahoga
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 781 N.E.2d 951, 954-55 (Ohio 2002); J.A. Croson Co. v. JA Guy,
Inc., 691 NE.2d 655, 660 (Ohio 1998); Lontz v. Tharp, 647 S.E.2d 718, 721-22 (W.Va. 2007).
245 Gregory, supra note 29, at 514 (citation omitted).

246 Drummonds, supra note 23, at 565.

359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959); see also Auto.
247 Cox, supra note 67, at 1005; see Garmon H1,
Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. v. Labumum Constr., 347 U.S. 656
(1954).
248 Garmon II, 359 U.S. at 243.
249 Cox, supra note 67, at 1005.
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the intentional infliction of emotional distress all escape the embrace of
Garmon preemption. 250 For example, in a trespass case against a picketing union, the Court suggested that the "arguably prohibited" prong of
Garmon might be limited to cases in which the state and NLRB proceedings address the "identical controversy. ' '25 1 Other cases suggested that a
"balancing test" superseded the Garmon analysis. 252 As Professor Gregory noted more than twenty years ago, "The litany of exceptions to Garmon, in areas wholly removed from the well-established violence and
local concern exceptions, threatens to swallow the doctrine, and has compromised the practicality of its application. ' 25 3 Many of the cases announcing exceptions to Garmon, moreover, involve state tort claims
against unions, or state laws regulating unions, an ironic twist to Justice
Frankfurter's earlier concerns about state court actions hostile to unions. 254 Again, state courts wrestling with preemption questions must
apply this complex body of federal law.
3.

Garmon's Effects on State Attempts to Update the Moribund
255
Law of Labor Relations

Today, Garmon's legacy stifles state-level labor relations initiatives,
in sharp contrast to the pattern of shared federal and state policy making
in most other areas of employment law. A look at a few selected cases
256
makes this clear.
250 See Drummonds, supra note 23, at 565-66 and cases cited therein.
251 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. S.D. County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
198 n.28, 200 (1978). Thus, even though the union picketing at issue in Sears was recognitional picketing and arguably prohibited under NLRA Section 8(b)(7), since the state trespass
action focused on the location rather than the purpose of the picketing, it was not preempted.
Under the original Garmon formulation, of course, it is the "arguably protected" or "prohibited" status of the conduct that controls analysis.
252 See, e.g., Allis-Chambers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 n.9 (1985) ("So-called
Garmon pre-emption involves protecting the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB, and requires a
balancing of state and federal interests."); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290,
295 (1977) ("The doctrine of pre-emption in labor law has been shaped primarily by two
competing interests.").
253 Gregory, supra note 29, at 527.
254 See, e.g., Linn v. Plant Guard Workers of Am., 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (knowing or reckless defamation claims against union and officers not preempted). Compare Old Dominion
Branch No. 496 Nat'l Ass'n. of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (non-malicious
libel claim against union preempted), with Brown v. Hotel and Rest. and Bartenders Int'l
Union, 468 U.S. 491 (1984) (state regulation of eligibility for union office in casino bargaining
unit not preempted), Sears, 436 U.S. 180 (state trespass action against union not preempted),
and Farmer,430 U.S. 290 (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against union and
union officials not preempted).
255 Cf. Estlund, The Death of Labor Law?, supra note 37.
256 See generally id.
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a. Gould
In the 1986 Gould case, a Wisconsin law debarring three-time unfair labor practice losers under the NLRA from state contracts suffered
federal preemption because the Supreme Court held that Garmon "prevents States . . .from providing their own regulatory or judicial reme25 7
dies" for conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA.

Wisconsin could not forbid private parties from doing business with repeat labor law violators, and, according to the Supreme Court, could not
even impose such a rule on itself under its spending power. 258 While
recognizing that "private purchasers" could lawfully boycott "labor law
violators," 259 the Court withheld that same control over contractual arrangements from state government. Wisconsin, the Court held, did not
enjoy that privilege under Garmon because Wisconsin's goal was "to
deter labor law violations and to reward fidelity to the law."260
This reasoning seems entirely inadequate. It would not cover, for
example, a state that debarred employers committing multiple unfair labor practices for reasons not of deterrence, but as an expression of the
moral indignation of its citizenry or as a sign of solidarity with the victims of illegal employer action, or even as a sign of solidarity with lawabiding employers seeking a level playing field for competition. In any
event, it seems doubtful that the Congresses that enacted the NLRA in
1935 and the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 even remotely understood these
enactments to prevent states from deterring labor law violations by the
use of their own powers to control the terms of state contracts. Certainly,
there was no "clear and manifest" expression of such a congressional
will.
As noted above, most forms of discrimination now trigger compensatory and punitive damages, as well as damages for emotional distress
under various federal and state statutes or common law theories. But
state statutes or common law theories, such as wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy, continue to fall under the strangling embrace
of Garmon when they are applied to restraint, coercion, or anti-union
activity discrimination. 26' Yet states remain free to effectively alter
NLRA remedies for these same federal violations, to the detriment of
257 See Wis. Dep't of Indus., Lab., & Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 286
(1986).
258 See id. at 287-89. At the time, at least four other states had similar laws: Connecticut,
Maryland, Michigan, and Ohio. See id. at 288 n.6.
259 Id. at 290.
260 id. at 287 (internal quotation omitted).
261 See, e.g., Luke v. Collotype Labels USA, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr.3d 440 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008); Rodriquez v. Yellow Cab Coop., Inc., 253 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Lontz v.
Tharp, 647 SE.2d 718 (W.Va. 2007).
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employees, by providing for the recoupment of unemployment benefits
262
from back pay awards.
b. Helmsley-Spear v. Fishman
Helmsley-Spear v. Fishman, a recent case involving a union's drumming-"a banging racket"-and handbilling outside the Empire State
Building shows how fluid the revised and evolved Garmon doctrine can
be. 263 The NLRB held that the union "was engaged in protected handbilling or leafleting" and that "the use of the drum... was not sufficient to
transform the leafleting activity into unlawful conduct. '' 264 But the New
York Court of Appeals, applying a balancing test, 265 nonetheless allowed
a state law nuisance action, reversing the Appellate Division, which had
2 66
dismissed the action under Garmon.
B.

The Machinists Doctrine and Its Extension in the 2008 Chamber
of Commerce Case
1. The Machinists Case

A different strand of federal labor law preemption doctrine grew
from a 1971-72 dispute in Wisconsin over an employer's attempt to extend the hours of work. 267 For seventeen years before the dispute
erupted, the employees worked a seven and a half-hour day and a thirty
seven and a half-hour workweek under the parties' collective labor contract.268 In contract negotiations for a successor contract, the employer
proposed work hours be extended to an eight-hour day and a forty-hour
269
week, and announced it would unilaterally implement the changes.
Union members voted to decline to work longer than their traditional
hours during continuing negotiations. 270 The employer charged the
union with unfair labor practices, but the NLRB Regional Director declined to issue a formal complaint on the ground that concerted economic
pressure during bargaining is neither unlawful nor protected under the
262 See, e.g., Moreno Roofing Co. v. Nagle, 99 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996) (California law
requiring plaintiff employer to repay state unemployment benefits when worker receives back
pay not preempted by the NLRA). While under the NLRA, mitigation requires back pay
awards be reduced by the worker's interim earnings, unemployment benefits are not deducted.
263 See Helmsley-Spear v. Fishman, 900 N.E.2d 934 (N.Y. 2008).
264 Id. at 935 (internal quotation omitted).
265 See id. at 938. Judge Read dissented, distinguishing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. S. D.
County Dist. Council of Carpenters,436 U.S. 180, as a case in which the NLRB had not ruled

on the conduct. See id. at 939-43 (Read, J.,
dissenting).
See 833 N.Y.S.2d 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. WERC, 427 U.S. 132, 134 (1976) [hereinafter Machinists].
268 See id.
269 See id.
270 See id.
266
267
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NLRA. 27' The employer filed a charge with the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission, challenging the overtime refusal under Wisconsin law.2 7 2 The Commission found that the overtime refusal was neither
arguably protected nor arguably prohibited under the NLRA, and hence
was not preempted under Garmon, thus violating state law. The Commission ultimately ordered the union and the employees to cease and
27 3
desist from the concerted overtime refusal.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a 6-3 decision.2 74 Justice
Brennan's opinion for the majority, while acknowledging earlier cases
eschewing preemption in similar cases, and agreeing that the union members' conduct was neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited by
federal law, nonetheless held that the state law fell to the preemption axe
because Congress intended such disputes to be resolved by "the free play
of economic forces. ' 27 5 Justice Brennan held that "the use of economic
pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception
(under)... the (federal) Act; it is part and parcel of the process of collec'276
tive bargaining.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Stewart and then-Justice Rehnquist, dissented on the ground that the union's "partial strike activity"
was neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited under the
NLRA; 277 that a 1949 Supreme Court case 27 8 upholding state regulation
of partial strike activity was never overturned by Congress; 279 and that
they were not persuaded "that partial strike activity is so essential to the
''
bargaining process that the States should not be free to regulate it. 280
What lessons for today can be gleaned from the 1976 Machinists
case? Once again, this was an implied conflict preemption case that ignored the presumption against preemption. Any conflict between the
Wisconsin statute and the NLRA could be found only by departing from
the text of the NLRA to find federal "rights" embedded sub silentio beyond the activities expressly protected by Section 7. This ventures far
from a clear and manifest congressional intent to displace the constitu271 See id. at 135.
272 See id.
273 See Machinists, 427 U.S. 132, 135-36 (1976).
274 See id.

275 Id. at 147; see also NLRB v. Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (holding
that the economic pressure in question was not a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith).
276 Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149 (quoting Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. at 495). Justice
Powell and Chief Justice Burger concurred, emphasizing that the states could, "in the context
of a labor dispute" still apply "state laws ... that are not directed toward altering the bargaining positions of employers or unions... [such as] their law of torts or of contracts .
I..."
Id. at
155-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
277 See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 156 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
278 Int'l. Union v. Wisc. Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
279 See Machinists, 427 U.S. 132, 156 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
280 Id. at 159.
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tional division of power to the states, as three members of the Court
found. 281 As shown below, the idea of NLRA self-help "rights," apart
from those explicitly set forth in Section 7, later provided the foundation
for the Supreme Court majority's extension of labor law preemption doctrine in the 2008 Chamber of Commerce case holding that California
could not condition the use of monies from state contracts upon non-use
in union organizing campaigns.
Significantly, the conclusion that the Wisconsin statute conflicted
with the NLRA required three analytical steps that were not made explicit in the majority's opinion. First, unconventional strike activitysuch as a slowdown, sit down, or the partial strike activity like the concerted refusal of overtime involved in Machinists-fall outside Section
7's general protection for "concerted activity . . . for mutual aid and
protection." Though inconsistent with a literal reading of Section 7, a
series of cases starting soon after the NLRA's enactment in 1935 held
that these concerted activities fell outside the protections of Section 7.282
Second, the Machinists majority assumed that Congress intended such
strike related activity, though unprotected by Section 7, to be among a
283
range of self-help activities that the NLRA implicitly guaranteed.
Third, having taken those two analytical steps, the Machinists majority
then took an analytical leap to find that Congress further implicitly intended, contrary to the Court's own earlier decision in the 1949 Briggs28 5
Stratton case, 284 to displace state regulation of these same activities.
Whether one considers such preemption of state authority to be wise or
unwise, the Machinists decision rested not on any congressional intent,
but on a federal labor law policy fashioned by a Supreme Court majority
in 1976.286 As with Garmon, the Machinists decision again seemed at
2 87
the time to offer protection from state restriction of union activity.
281 See id. at 156-59.
282 See NLRB v. Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (concerted slowdown not
protected); NLRB v. Local 1229 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (handbilling
during labor dispute not protected where handbills attacked quality of employer's conduct and
did not relate to labor dispute); Int'l Union v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1949) [hereinafter Briggs-Stratton](intermittent strike activity not protected); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (sit-down strike not protected). Because such
activities are unprotected, an employer can lawfully fire employees who engage in these

activities.
283 This assumption was derived from Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477.
284 Briggs-Stratton, 336 U.S. 245.
285 The Court in Briggs-Stratton found preemption was implied by the implied right to
engage in unprotected, and hence, subject to employer discipline, "slowdown" activity. See id.
286 Justice Stevens made just this point in his dissent for three Justices: "Despite the nu-

merous statements in the Court's opinion about Congress' intent to leave partial strike activity
wholly unregulated, I have found no legislative expression of any such intent .... " Machinists, 427 U.S. 132, 157 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
287 Represented employees, however, seldom draw solace from the Machinists holding
that states cannot regulate slowdowns. That is because the self-help rationale also means that
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The Post-MachinistsCases

Soon enough, as with Garmon, the Machinists doctrine began to be
used to challenge state laws favorable to union activity and employee
rights.
The first flurry of cases rejected arguments to extend Machinists. In
1978, an employer challenged the Minnesota Private Pension Benefit
Protection Act, which imposed a pension funding charge against employers who ceased to operate a place of employment or pension plan; the
Supreme Court rejected a Machinists challenge to the Minnesota law, but
it proved a harbinger of many challenges to come. 288 The next year,
New York's law allowing unemployment benefits for strikers reached
the Supreme Court. The employer argued that the law disturbed the balance of self-help remedies in labor disputes and the Machinists case's
"free play of economic forces," but the Supreme Court rejected the argument. 289 In two cases decided a few years later, the Court upheld state
labor standards legislation against arguments that Machinists' "free play
of economic forces" policy required that such decisions be made by the
290
parties to the collective bargaining relationship rather than the state.
Cases striking down state law favorable to union interests also followed Machinists. In 1986, the Court majority extended Machinists to
overturn an action by the Los Angeles City Council conditioning renewal
of a taxicab franchise on the cab company's settling a labor dispute with
its drivers. 29 1 It seems hard to imagine that either the 1935 or 1947 Congress meant to limit the powers of municipal governments in this way or
to impinge upon the right of union members to seek and gain the support
employers facing concerted slowdowns can fire employees participating in the slowdown.
Under the self-help right created by the Supreme Court, slowdowns are unprotected under the
federal labor law, and the two-way street of self-help applies to the employer as well.
288 See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
289 See N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. Dep't of Lab., 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
290 See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987) (Maine severance pay law
for plant closure not preempted); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(Massachusetts-mandated health plan benefits statute not preempted); see also Viceroy Gold
Corporation v. Aubry, 75 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 1996) (California statute permitting only unionized miners to work over eight hours per day not preempted); Wash. Serv. Contractors Co. v.
D.C., 54 F.3d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (District enactment requiring contractors taking over service contract from predecessor contractors to retain employees not preempted); Nat'l Broad.
Co. v. Bradshaw, 70 F.3d 69 (9th Cir. 1995) (state overtime pay statute not preempted in
context of impasse in dispute between employer and union); Babler Bros., Inc. v. Roberts, 995
F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1993) (Oregon statute requiring overtime over eight hours on public works
projects, absent collective bargaining agreement, not preempted).
291 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986). Moreover, in 1989, the Court held that local governments that violate the Machinists doctrine by
interfering with the free play of economic forces in a labor dispute governed by the NLRA
face liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,
493 U.S. 103 (1989).
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of their local governments in labor disputes. Yet, again, the Court, and
not Congress, displaced of the constitutional division of powers.
Similarly, state efforts to limit or ban striker replacement fell under
the federal shield of Machinists preemption. 292 Despite Supreme Court
rulings in the 1980s holding that the states retained authority under the
NLRA to adopt labor standards legislation, 29 3 the Seventh Circuit recently applied the Machinists doctrine to preempt an Illinois statute governing rest breaks and meal periods for hotel attendants in Cook County
that had been enacted during a strike by hotel attendants against a hotel
owner. 294 The Court of Appeals interpreted Machinists to apply where
'295
labor standards legislation was not "a law of general application.
Since the Illinois Hotel Attendant Amendment applied only "to one occupation, in one industry, in one county," it fell to Machinists preemption. 296 The Court of Appeals purportedly relied on rulings in the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits making the same distinction. 297 Under this reasoning, many occupation and industry-specific state hours-of-work statutes
are vulnerable.
292 See, e.g., Employers Assn. v. United Steelworkers, 32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994) (Minnesota Striker Replacement Law preempted); Kapiolani Med. Ctr. for Women and Children v.
Hawaii, 82 F. Supp.2d 1151 (D. Haw. 2000) (statute imposing liability on employment agencies aiding employers seeking striker replacements preempted); Illinois v. Fed. Tool and
Plastic, 344 N.E.2d 1 (I11.1975) (Illinois law requiring disclosure of labor dispute in advertisements seeking striker replacements preempted); Mich. State Chamber of Commerce v. Michigan., No. 83-256399-CZ, 1984 WL 61212 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 25, 1984) (Michigan
Strikebreaker Law preempted under Machinists); Mid-West Motor Express v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 512 NW.2d 881 (Minn. 1994) (Minnesota Striker Replacement Act preempted
under Machinists doctrine). For a recent argument for changing the permanent replacement
doctrine at the national level, see Joseph P. Norelli, PermanentReplacements: Time for a New
Look?, 24 LAB. LAW. 97 (2008). As Lance Compa has pointed out, the position of the United
States on permanent replacement violates obligations under international law as interpreted by
the International Labor Organization. See LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKER'S
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

STANDARDS xvii-xviii
293
294

(2004).

See Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. 1; Metro. Life Ins. Co.,, 471 U.S. 724.
See 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assoc. Ltd. v. Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 2008).

Id. at 1139.
Id. The Illinois statute applied only to counties with populations exceeding 3,000,000
and Cook County was the only one covered. See id. at 1130 n.7.
297 See id. at 1130 (citing Chamber of Commerce v. Bragdon, 64 F.3d 497 (9th Cir.
1995); Barnes v. Stone Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1991); Hull v. Dutton, 935
F.2d 1194 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Cannon v. Edgar, 33 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 1994) (striking
down under both Garmon and Machinists an Illinois law requiring cemeteries and gravediggers to negotiate for a pool of workers to perform religiously required interments during labor
disputes); New England Health Care v. Rowland, 221 F. Supp. 2d 297 (D. Conn. 2002) (payment of Medicaid subsidies and transportation of replacement and non-striking workers preempted); United Steelworkers v. St. Gabriel Hosp., 871 F. Supp. 335 (D. Minn. 1994)
(Minnesota successor statute preempted); Levy v. Verizon Info. Servs. Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d
586 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (wage deduction law claims preempted).
295

296
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Furthermore, the courts sometimes find non-preemption when unions invoke "the free play of economic forces" theory; that is, rulings
against Machinists preemption do not always favor unions. In 1983, for
example, the Supreme Court considered a case involving striker replacements who sued their employer for fraud and breach of contract after
they were laid off when a strike settled. The Court, with three Justices
dissenting, held that the replacement workers' state law misrepresentation and breach of contract claims survived arguments that the NLRA

29 8
left such matters to the parties' self-help remedies under Machinists.

Or, to take another example, in the Empire State Building drumming
case, the New York Court of Appeals refused to apply Machinists preemption doctrine to bar a state nuisance action, even though the NLRB
dismissed unfair labor practice charges against the union, because
"[I]oud drumming is not an 'integral part of the legislative scheme' of the
299
NLRA."
Project labor agreements between unions and local government bodies also generate debate under the Machinists' "free play of economic
forces" doctrine. The Supreme Court upheld such an agreement in a case
involving the federally-required clean up of Boston Harbor. 30 0 In distinguishing between "government as regulator and government as proprietor," 30 1 the Court cautioned that the agreement "was specifically tailored

to one particular job, the Boston Harbor cleanup project. '30 2 Thus, state
and local governments can prefer union labor agreements for projects ad
hoc but not as a general policy. 30 3 Again, such intent cannot credibly be

attributed to the 1935 or 1947 Congress.
Finally, several states have proposed "Worker Freedom Act" legislation, which would restrict captive audience meetings and grant other
employee rights. 3°4 This proposed legislation remains vulnerable to
298 Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
299 See Helmsley-Spear v. Fishman, 900 N.E.2d 934, 939 (N.Y. 2008) (quoting Bldg.
Trades Employers' Educ. Ass'n v. McGowan, 311 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 2002)).
300 See Bldg and Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Assoc. Builders and Contractors of Mass./R.I., 507 U.S. 218 (1993).
301 Id. at 227.

302 Id. at 232.
303 Compare Metro. Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 431 F.3d 277
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the NLRA preempts a county ordinance requiring labor peace
agreements for county contracts), and Ohio State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Cuyahoga
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 781 N.E.2d 951 (Ohio 2002) (holding that the NLRA preempts a
state statute prohibiting creation or enforcement of project labor agreements in public works
contracts), with George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Turnpike Auth., 644 A.2d 76 (N.J. 1994)
(holding that the NLRA does not preempt a resolution particular to the construction industry
requiring prospective contractors to enter into project labor agreements).
304 See, e.g., Senate Bill 519 (Or. 2009); see also Naomi Lavelle-Haslitt, It's a Wrap!
2009 Oregon LegislatureAdjourns After Creating New Employment and Labor Concerns and
Considerations for Employers, http://www.martindale.comlabor-employment-law/articleMiller-Nash-LLP_767158.htm (Aug. 6, 2009).
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challenges under Machinists,30 5 especially after the Chamber of Commerce decision.
3.

The Culmination of Machinists-A State Cannot Control the
Use of Taxpayer Monies in State Contracts-the 2008
Chamber of Commerce Decision
In response to union lobbying, in 2000, California legislators
adopted a statute prohibiting "employers that receive state funds ... from
using those funds to 'assist, promote, or deter union organizing.' 30 6 As
expressed in the preamble, the purpose of the statute was to "prohibit an
employer from using state funds ...

for the purpose of influencing em-

ployees to support or oppose unionization and to prohibit an employer
from seeking to influence employees to support or oppose unionization
while those employees are performing work on a state contract. '30 7 The
California statute, however, expressly exempted employer expenditures
allowing union representatives access and expenses for the negotiation of
a "voluntary recognition agreement" with a union. 308 An en banc majority of the Ninth Circuit upheld the California statute because "Congress
did not intend to preclude the States from imposing such restrictions on
the use of its own funds,"' 30 9 drawing a distinction between a condition

on receiving state funds, which was condemned by the Supreme Court in
Gould,3 10 and a condition on the use of such funds.
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court ruled the contested provisions
of the statute were preempted under Machinists because they reach an
area protected by "congressional intent to shield a zone of activity from
regulation .... ,,31! Justice Stevens, who dissented in Machinists,31 2
wrote the majority decision thirty years later in Chamber of Commerce.3 13 His opinion reasoned that NLRA Section 8(c), which provides
that non-coercive free speech "shall not be an unfair labor practice or
evidence of an unfair labor practice," 31 4 constitutes an "explicit direction
from Congress to leave non-coercive speech unregulated," in effect, elevating an employer's desire to speak against unionization to an affirma305 See Secunda, supra note 32, at 212-13, 226-27.
306 Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2410 (2008) (quoting CAL. Gov'T

CODE §§ 16645-49 (West Supp. 2008)).
307 Id. at 2411 (quoting 2000 Cal. Stats. ch. 872, §1). The California statute tracked the
language of several federal statutes that similarly restricted the use of federal funds. See id. at
2417-19.
308 Id. at 2411 (quoting CAL. Gov'T CODE. § 16647(d)).
309 Id. at 2412 (citing Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1085-96 (9th
Cir. 2006)).
310 See Wis. Dep't of Indus., Lab. & Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
311 Chamber of Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2414.
312 Machinists, 427 U.S. 132, 157 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
313 See Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
314 National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).
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tive right under NLRA, though Section 7(c) is explicitly phrased merely
as a restriction on the use of speech in unfair labor practice
31 5
proceedings.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented on this further
extension of the Machinists doctrine. 31 6 Pointing out that the Court assumed the Wisconsin statute struck down in Gould was for the purpose
of deterring unfair labor practices, a violation of the Garmon doctrine's
"arguably prohibited" prong, Justice Breyer declared that "California's
statute . . . does not seek to compel labor-related activity . . . [or] "to
forbid labor-related activity. '31 7 And, according to Justice Breyer, a statute would violate the Machinists doctrine only if it unreasonably restricts
or discourages the use of employers' own funds. 31 8 The "mighty oak" of
judicially created preemption doctrine continues to grow without congressional guidance.
C.

The Premises of the Broad Preemption Doctrines Announced in
Garmon and Machinists and Extended in Later Cases are No
Longer Supportable

The idea of a "uniform national labor policy" lies in shambles for
six reasons. First, it no longer fits within the broader landscape of American workplace law as it has evolved over the past several decades.
Shared federal and state responsibility within federal minimum standards
has become the baseline rule in employment law, and as with employment law in general, labor relations law badly needs the experimentation,
flexibility, and greater citizen empowerment inherent in a less centralized
and constricting federal regime.
Second, state courts already swim in oceans of federal labor law.
Ironically, state courts must interpret and apply federal labor law in all its
complexity; interpret and apply the federal "common law" of collective
labor contract under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act; and entertain
suits against unions under the duty of fair representation, an essential
ingredient of federal labor law. Furthermore, state courts entertain a variety of tort claims against unions under the many exceptions to
3 19
preemption.
Third, within the NLRA itself, federal law already gives states authority over two key labor relations issues. The first is the most basic of
all labor law issues-the "right to work" or "union shop" issue-which
has, since the introduction of the Taft-Harley Act, been subject to control
315 Chamber of Commerce, 128

316
317
318
319

S. Ct. at 2414.
See id. at 2419 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2420.
See id. at 2421-22. Justice Breyer would have remanded on this issue.
See supra Part V.A.2 and accompanying footnotes.
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by the states under Section 14(b) of the NLRA. 320 More than twenty
states have such "right to work" laws, and union membership is at its
lowest in many of those states. 32' The second is that, within the statutory
scheme of the NLRA itself, the issue of union access is already theoretically tied to state laws regarding property rights. Thus, a union's interest
in access to the disputed property must be balanced against an em32 2
ployer's state law property rights:
Under [federal NLRA cases] the rights of non-employee
union representatives to access to an employer's private
property are based in state law. Where state common
law grants an employer the right to exclude nonemployee union organizers from its property, the NLRA
guarantees access only if the union can show that employees are otherwise inaccessible ....

Where state law

grants nonemployee union organizers the right to access
the employer's property, a violation of these state rights
323
will also be a violation of the NLRA.
Therefore, under this federal labor law analysis, union organizers have
more access to shopping centers in California than in many other states.
Fourth, states have a major effect on labor disputes through their
authority to provide unemployment benefits to strikers, notwithstanding
the obvious effect this has on the "free play of economic forces" during a
324
bargaining impasse.

Fifth, the NLRB itself suffers from politicization, gridlock, and the
inability to decide cases raising important issues. In 2008, approximately
20-25% of its caseload was not decided for more than a year. 325 The
New Deal-era and Frankfurtian ideal of exclusive and expert administrative agency regulation has failed, undermined by the Supreme Court's
many decisions overturning the Board on crucial policy issues.
320 See National Labor Relations Act § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006).
321 See Cox, supra note 67, at 1193 (the states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming); NLRB, Union
Members in 2008, supra note 38 at tbl.5 (comparing rates of union representation in the afore-

mentioned states).
322 See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
NLRB, 540 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2008).
323 United Bhd. of Carpenters,540 F.3d at 962.
324 See, e.g., N.Y. Tel. v. N.Y. Dep't. of Lab., 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
325 See Bor, supra note 235; see also James Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The
NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221 (2005); Joan Flynn, A Quiet
Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB 1935-2000, 61 OHIo ST. L.
REV. 1363 (2000); Thomas Kochan, A Silver Anniversary Not Worth Celebrating: The Impasse Over American Labor and Employment Policies, 25 Com'. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 79

(2003).
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Finally, greater decentralization of labor management relations policy follows significant examples both within and outside the United
States. The states have long played a major role in the collective bargaining laws for many American workers, including public employees,
agricultural employees in states like California and Florida, and employees of small businesses that do not meet the NLRB's jurisdictional guidelines. 326 Moreover, in the past decade, hundreds of thousands of home
health and childcare workers have been organized through state level initiatives. 327 Looking beyond the borders of the United States, the Canadian labor relations system allows many major policy decisions to be
made at the provincial level. 328 In the European Union, the laws of
member states continue to control labor relations, even though significant
initiatives are also made at the EU level, such as the Works Council
32 9
Directive.
VI.
A.

A

VISIOM OF A NEW FEDERALISM REGIME FOR LABOR RELATIONS

Some Proposals

The following are a few modest suggestions for how loosened federal control might work hand-in-hand with policy judgments to adjust the
law more favorably to provide union representation to employees who
want it. First, Congress should declare that states may provide the same
remedies for anti-union discrimination as they provide for other forms of
discrimination and wrongful discharge under state law.
Second, Congress should allow state and local governments to control the expenditure of tax monies without the stifling restrictions of
cases like Chamber of Commerce v. Brown and Gould v. Wisconsin La326 Cf National Labor Relations Act §§ 14(c)(1)-(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 164(c)(1)-(2) (2006).
See generally ROBERT GORMAN & MATTHEW FINKIN, LABOR LAW, UNION ORGANIZING, AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (2d ed. 2004).
327 See Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home Health Care Workers in State Labor
Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1390, 1404 (2008) (citing organizing campaign and state laws in
California, Illinois, Oregon, Washington, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Massachusetts, Kansas,
and New Jersey).
328 See Health Servs. and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass'n v. B.C., [2007]
S.C.R. 391; JAMES ATLESON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW 131-57 (2008) (describing
Canadian Supreme Court decisions establishing certain "fundamental rights" in labor relations
binding on the provinces under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms); ROGER
BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOY-

MENT LAW 158-59 (2007); David J. Doorey, The Medium and the "Anti-Union Message:
"Forced Listening" and Captive Audience Meetings in Canadian Labor Law, 29 COMP. LAB.
LAW & POL'Y J. 79, 81 (2008) ("Since 1925, principle [sic] jurisdiction over labor relations
has resided with the provinces.").
329 E.g., 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64 (on the establishment of a European Works Council or a
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for
the purposes of informing and consulting employees). For a description of the interrelationship between nation-state laws and EU Directives in the labor relations area, see ATLESON ET
AL, supra note 328, at 347-55.
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bor Relations Board.330 This freedom should extend to the efforts of
state and local governments to exercise governmental prerogatives in response to the wishes of their citizens, as in the Los Angeles taxicab
33 1
franchise case.
Third, states should be allowed to experiment with various means of
ensuring that employee preferences control the question of exclusive
union representation, including mechanisms such as card checks, periodic union elections, equal access rights, abolition of captive audience
meetings, and non-majority representation of members only by unions in
non-exclusive bargaining arrangements. These experiments could be
subject to Department of Labor approval and modeled after the reverse
preemption provisions of OSHA.
Fourth, states should be allowed to experiment with impasse procedures and other matters affecting parties enmeshed in labor disputes, including laws involving the permanent replacement of strikers, lockouts,
and the use of various forms of interest arbitration to resolve bargaining
disputes, such as use of arbitration as a remedy for failure to bargain in
good faith.
Finally, the decentralization of labor relations policy may take many
forms not discussed here. This Article offers some specific ideas to
demonstrate that decentralization is possible within a properly conceived
balance of shared federal and state policy authority. It is not the specifics, but rather the broader idea of more labor policy decentralization that
is the focus this Article.
B.

Objections

The discussion above addresses the mantra-like arguments traditionally advanced for the Garmon and Machinists preemption doctrines: the
need for the expertise of a New Deal-era administrative agency, the need
for a uniform national labor policy, and the near-perfection of that policy
from the point of view of managers and businesses. This part addresses
the more practical problems with decentralization.
1. Laws Unfavorable to Unions
Might states pass laws unfavorable to unions, frustrating the proposed federal policy to rebalance labor laws to favor renewed fostering
of the right to representation? This would indeed be a risk, especially in
"right to work" states. But, there are two responses. First, the citizens in
New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, California, Ore330 Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008); Wis. Dep't of Indus., Lab.,
& Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
331 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
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gon, Washington, Nevada, 332 and other states with significant levels of
support for unions, should no longer be imprisoned by a stifling federal
orthodoxy. As in other areas of employment law, such as discrimination
or wage and hour law, there is no need to require all areas of the country
to adhere to the lowest common denominator of federal labor law.
Second, and more importantly, this Article calls for shared federal
and state authority within minimum federal labor relations standards.
Significantly, under Section 7 of the NLRA, only employees find protection. Thus, a state could not make conduct protected by Section 7 unlawful. Additionally, under the aforementioned proposals, a state could not
legalize conduct that Section 8 forbids for example, union secondary
boycotts, 333 or Section 8(a) prohibited employer actions. 334 Moreover,
statutory reform could make it clear that a state may supplement NLRA
remedies only to an extent consistent with the proposed congressional
policy to allow states to develop laws more protective of unions or other
forms of collective representation.
At first blush, this might seem one-sided. But, notwithstanding the
assertions of neoclassical thinkers,3 35 federal labor law in 1935 reflected,
as it still reflects today, an explicit judgment that employees are generally the weaker party in their relationships with employers. 336 Working
conditions, however, are different today, and labor relations policy must
be reformed to allow for state policies that protect the right to organize
and that foster worker participation in the policies and sharing of corporations. More unionization in the private sector and possibly other forms
of employee participation in corporate governance will help to restore
more structural balance against the swollen powers of the executive suite
and financial centers in our economy. A prospering middle class is a
prerequisite to national economic health, and the decentralization of labor relations policy provides a way to promote these policies in a spirit
of experimentation, flexibility, and power sharing.
2.

Big Labor and Big Business in Washington, D.C.

Big Business and Big Labor may quite naturally be reluctant to cede
more authority to state level lawmaking, lobbying, and political action; to
332 According to the NLRB, each of the named states has union membership rates at or
above 15 percent, more than twice the national average. New York ranks first at 24.9 percent.
See NLRB, Union Members in 2008, supra note 38,
333 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2006). Whether
the secondary boycott provision of the NLRA should be revisited is outside the scope of this
article.
334 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
335 See, e.g., Nathan Gardels, Stiglitz: The Fall of Wall Street Is To Market Fundamentalism What the Fall of the Berlin Wall Was to Communism, HuFFINGTON PosT, Sept. 16, 2008,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/stiglitz-the-fall-of-wall-b_126911 .html.
336 See National Labor Relations Act §1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
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state business and labor groups; and to the representatives and citizens of
state and local governments. Ironically, both labor and business organizations, headquartered in Washington D.C., may fear the results of a
more decentralized system that compromises each of their perceived,
though contradictory, interests.
In any event, decentralization in labor relations policy implicates
more than the narrow interests of national labor federations like the AFLCIO and business groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Under
the proposals advanced here, more labor relations decision making would
devolve to state and local governments, unions, and business groups.
But the sky will not fall, and national labor and business groups would
still be able to continue in their present important role of working for the
interests of employees and business in Congress and elsewhere, just as
they do now for occupational health regulations, discrimination law,
family leave, and wage and hour policy. Even if national labor federations and business groups choose not to lead a decentralizing reform,
labor activists, lawyers, and managers working in Washington, D.C., will
simply adapt to the change in a rebalanced federalism structure for labor
relations. It is yesterday's idea that citizens in the states cannot play a
vital and necessary role in this rebalancing.
CONCLUSION

The Employee Free Choice Act has sparked an important discussion
about union representation and the role of unions in our overall economy.
The decentralization urged in this Article seeks to continue that discussion. Labor relations policy is about balancing the structures in our economic system to encourage markets for goods and services, to discourage
excess, and to bring about a broader market-based sharing of the proceeds and bounty of the economy. It will perhaps come as no surprise
that the author supports passage of the Employee Free Choice Act. But
the Act raises many fundamental questions of labor relations policy on
which no national consensus exists. The virtual death throes of most
private sector unions as collective bargaining representatives of all but a
small percentage of employees cries out for experimentation, flexibility,
and the involvement of citizens and union members at the local and state
level. Just as the Taft-Hartley Congress in 1947 met the perceived
abuses of that time by readjusting the national labor policy, so today we
face different circumstances requiring a policy adjustment that is more
favorable to employee choice of union representation. Instead of a stifling federal orthodoxy, the situation today calls for shifting more responsibility to citizens in the states.

